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1 Introduction
The conservation and management of marine living resources has been fraught with
problems since decades and nothing indicates that this is likely to change in the near future.
To set hopes high would also be unrealistic due to the fundamental characteristics of marine
fish, namely that they are a common property and renewable natural resource incapable of
being spatially confined.2 The 1998 United Nations General Assembly Report “Oceans and
                                               
1 E.J. Molenaar is Research Associate at the Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea (NILOS), Utrecht
University and is currently stationed at the Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, Australia.
M. Tsamenyi is Director of the Centre for Maritime Policy. Dr. Molenaar’s involvement in the issue of
satellite-based VMSs commenced with a request by the Commission of the European Community (EC; in
Mauritius) to prepare a presentation for a meeting of the Indian Ocean Commission, held in Mauritius,
February 1999. Professor Tsamenyi has been actively involved in satellite-based VMSs in his position as
Fisheries Law Adviser to the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA); a position he held until June
1999. The authors are grateful for the comments by D.H. Anderson, A. Bedford, W. Heere, H. Koster, R.
Lagoni, A. Oude Elferink, R. Rayfuse and J. Verborgh on an earlier version of this article.
2 Cf. R.R. Churchill, EEC Fisheries Law, Dordrecht/Boston, Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p.
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the law of the sea. Report of the Secretary-General” identifies as key factors responsible for
the current global overexploitation and economically inefficient fisheries:
the lack of political will to make difficult adjustments, particularly in respect of access to fishery
resources and fishing rights, persistence of direct and indirect subsidies, lack of control of fishing
fleets by flag States, resistance of the fishing industry to changes, lack of participation of
traditional fishing communities in the decision-making process and continued use of destructive
fishing practices.3
This enumeration is by no means exhaustive and a range of more specific defects could be
mentioned as well. This article does not single out one of these factors, although the core
issues all relate to the lack of flag State control. Rather than focussing on efforts aimed at
strengthening flag State control directly, the focus will be on one particular tool: satellite-
based vessel monitoring systems (VMSs), and its use in fisheries management.4 However,
as will be clarified, it would be incorrect to regard this tool exclusively from the perspective of
enforcement.
The purpose of this article is to analyze a State’s rights and obligations under
international law with respect to satellite-based VMSs for fisheries management.
Appropriate account will be paid to relevant provisions in global instruments relating to
marine fisheries management, viz. the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(LOSC),5 Chapter 17 of Agenda 216, the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement,7 the 1995 Fish
Stocks Agreement,8 and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct9 and its Technical Guidelines.10
The article begins by explaining the operational aspects of satellite-based VMSs in Section 2
and its place in fisheries management in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the relationship
between satellite-based VMSs and the law of the sea, which forms the brunt of the legal
analysis, and Section 5 briefly discusses aspects of space law. After Section 6 devotes
attention to developments in State practice, Section 7 formulates concluding remarks.
                                                                                                                                                 
3, who identifies four consequences for the regulation of marine fisheries: (1) a tendency for fish stocks to
be fished above biologically optimum levels; (2) a tendency for more fishermen to engage in a fishery than
is economically justified; (3) a likelihood of competition and conflict between different groups of fishermen;
and (4) the necessity for any regulation of marine fisheries to have a substantial international component.
3 UN Doc. A/53/456, para. 261.
4 Improving flag State performance in high seas fisheries is the main objective of the 1993 Compliance
Agreement (see infra). For definitions of flag, port and coastal States, see Section 4.1.
5 Montego Bay, 10 December 1982. In force 16 November 1994, XX International Legal Materials 1245
(1982). As at 1 January 2000, 132 States and the EC were Parties to the LOSC.
6 Agenda 21, Annex II to the Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio
de Janeiro, 3 to 14 June 1992. A/CONF.151/26. Particularly relevant are paras. 17.44-17.96.
7 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas, Rome, 24 November 1993. Not in force, 33 International Legal Materials 969
(1994). As at October 1999, 14 acceptancies were received (25 needed).
8 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 4 August 1995. Not in force, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 29 (1995),
p. 25. As at 1 January 2000 there were 25 States Parties (30 needed).
9 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Rome, 31 October 1995.
http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/FISHERY/fishery.htm (FAO Fisheries Department’s website).
According to FAO Conference Resolution 15/93, para. (3) the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement forms an
integral part of the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
10 Technical Guidelines in Support of the Implementation of the Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries.
So far, the FAO Fisheries Department has published the following Technical Guidelines: No. 1: Fishing
Operations; No. 2: Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions; No. 3:
Integration of Fisheries into Coastal Area Management; No. 4: Fisheries Management; No. 5: Aquaculture
Development; and No. 6: Inland Fisheries (all available on the FAO Fisheries Department’s website). Other
Technical Guidelines are still under preparation. Particularly relevant here is: Fishing Operations. 1. Vessel
Monitoring Systems (Rome, FAO, 1998), which is Supplement No. 1 to the Technical Guidelines No. 1
(further referred to as FAO VMS Guidelines).
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2 Satellite-based VMSs: How it works
In laymen terms, a satellite-based VMS involves the monitoring of vessels within certain
areas for the purpose of, inter alia, ascertaining the vessels’ location and/or the type of
activity in which they are engaged. In the context of this article, this activity will of course be
fishing. Conventional types of VMSs do not rely on satellites but on vessel movement
reports by radio, aerial or surface surveillance, land based radar, sea based sonar, observer
programs or incidental reports by other (fishing) vessels or airplanes.11
A preliminary distinction which has to be made is that between vessels that have or
have not installed so-called ‘automatic location communicators’ (ALCs).12 This equipment is
capable of automatically transmitting a signal with position and other information, to a
satellite or another type of receiving station.13 Currently, the main satellite systems which
can be used for this purpose in addition to a variety of other purposes various are Inmarsat
and Argos.14
With the installment of ALCs, it will first of all be easy to determine the location of
(identified) vessels at any given time or, in addition to that, all other information transmitted
by the signal. It is of course not possible to verify whether vessels that have not installed
such equipment are engaging in illegal activities. This is possible through what is, for the
purpose of this article, called ‘Satellite Remote Sensing’ (SRS). SRS involves the use of
satellites for the collection of all kinds of data relating to the earth’s surface and even
subsurface conditions. Currently, there are only two satellites using Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) technology, viz. RadarSat-1 and ERS-2, which are capable of not only locating
a vessel, but also of ascertaining with some degree of certainty that a vessel is engaged in
fishing.15 A possible alternative for the rather expensive SRS is the use of Over the Horizon
Radar (OHR)16 or enhanced radar capability on airplanes.
With respect to vessels equipped with ALCs, information will, at certain intervals, be
automatically transmitted to a satellite before ultimately ending up at a fishery monitoring
centre (FMC). Here it can be checked if a fishing vessel is allowed to fish in the area where
it is located and how long it stays there. Based on the vessel’s speed and navigation
                                               
11 Certain States, for instance Mozambique, have adopted a system of ‘self-surveillance’ under which licensed
fishing vessels are required to report on (alleged) illegal fishing activities (noted in FAO Doc.
GCP/INT/606/NOR, Report of a Regional Workshop on Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
(Albion, Mauritius, 16-20 December 1996)’, Rome, FAO, 1997, at p. 10). This imposes therefore an
obligation on those who would already have an incentive to oppose free riders.
12 These are transmitters or transceivers integrated with Global Positioning System (GPS) and an automated
reporting system (cf. FAO VMS Guidelines, p. 8). Terminology used instead of ALCs includes: Vessel
Location Device (VLD; used by FAO VMS Guidelines) and ‘vessel tracking device’ (EC Commission
Regulation No 1489/97, of 29 July 1997, Official Journal 1997, L 202/18). See also the developments on
automatic identification systems (AIS) within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in Section 4.2.
13 For example by radio (VHF).
14 Quite recently, Argos became also capable of two-way communications. Inmarsat is operated by the
International Maritime Satellite Organization. A variety of regional systems exist as well, for example
Euteltracs and Boatracs in Europe and the United States respectively. Eutelsat stands for the European
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (J. Fitzpatrick, Satellite Data Communication Systems, Remote
Sensing and Other Techniques as an Aid to Monitoring, Control, Surveillance and Enforcement, in: ‘1996
Mauritius Workshop’, supra note 11, at pp. 131-132).
15 In their current application, however, these systems still have many deficiencies. For example, accuracy is
affected by the vessel’s speed and size, and sea surface conditions, it is relatively expensive and the revisit
time of the satellite could be considerable. This is not to say that in certain situations it could already be
used as an addition to tracking ships equipped with ALCs. Other relevant satellites include Envisat (launch
in 1999) and Palsar (launch in 2002) (information based on F. Jansen, Satellite Surveillance in Support of
Sustainable Fisheries Management, unpublished paper, 1999; Fitzpatrick 1997, supra note 14, at p. 132;
and FAO VMS Guidelines, pp. 9-10).
16 As suggested by R.G. Lovingfoss at the International Conference on Satellite Technology in Fisheries,
Cairns, Queensland (15-18 August 1999). Moreover, cellular phone technology may soon be capable of
providing store-and-forward position reporting in littoral areas (G. Hitchen and S. Yin, VMS – A U.S.
Perspective, unpublished paper presented at the 1999 Cairns Conference (this note supra), Section 4.1).
4
patterns, which reveal a so-called ‘fishing signature’, it can even be determined if it is
engaged in fishing. This can even be used for multiple-license (multiple-species) fishing as
most types of fishing have a more or less unique fishing signature. ALCs can, to some
extent, also be remotely controlled by ‘polling’, for example by changing the duration
between vessel position reports if analysis indicates that a vessel should be more or less
closely monitored. The polling function can be carried out by ‘decision engines’ which are
also capable of automatically generating recommendations on the necessary steps of
enforcement.
In addition to transmitting identification and location data, the technology is already, or
will soon be, available to transmit a wide range of other voluntarily provided information
(such as catch reports) or automatically generated evidence that a vessel is engaged in
fishing. On-board sensors could, for example, indicate not only the vessel’s speed and
direction but also information on the operation of the engine(s) or the hydraulic boom used
for the fishing gear.17 Sensors could also be used to transmit information valuable to
fisheries management, for example sea temperature and salinity.18 The possibility of
integrating all this information with data obtained by other means (SRS, sea depth, catch
reports/statistics) can create a powerful tool in enhancing not only compliance but fisheries
management in a broad sense. Insight in the spatial distribution of biomass, both overall and
near real-time, facilitates tailored management measures and deters illegal behavior.
Information on a vessel’s identity and location, or even whether it is engaged in fishing
or not, is of great value when linked to certain management measures, such as closed
areas or seasons (in general or for specific ships), ‘exclusion zones’,19 or restricted fishing
effort through fixed fishing days. In the absence of such management measures, the main
objective is limited to verification of catch-reporting requirements. Collected data are then
checked with the vessel’s logbook in which entries should be made of all catches and their
location, and/or tracking and logbook information of other vessels operating simultaneously
in the same area.20
A satellite-based VMS which is only capable of monitoring vessels equipped with ALCs,
obviously has an inherently limited scope of application. SRS or OHR could therefore be
used to locate vessels that have not installed ALCs or that tamper with them and, based on
speed and navigation patterns, ascertain if the vessel is engaged in fishing. As such
systems are unable to assess a vessel’s identification, it will subsequently be necessary to
contact and identify the potential offender by aircraft or patrol boats. Aircraft will confront the
operator/owner of the ship with the offense, take photographs which can be used as proof in
further enforcement steps, or give other directions. Patrol boats will intercept the alleged
offender and take appropriate enforcement measures.
Interception and/or photographs will, in many cases, also be necessary in relation to
vessels equipped with ALCs. This will be the only way to order or bring the vessel into port.
In addition, the judiciary may not accept the transmitted information as sufficient evidence to
establish that a violation has taken place.21 There are several factors that should be taken
into account when assessing the cost-effectiveness of the most optimal mix of forms of
                                               
17 See Fitzpatrick 1997, supra note 14, at pp. 141-143.
18 The VMS used by the Maldives already has this feature and Peru also contemplates this. It not only gives
indications on the location of tuna but also where other (illegally operating) vessels are most likely to
operate.
19 See Section 4.3.1.1.
20 It can probably often be argued that (1) even though the ship was located somewhere for a certain time,
and (2) speed and navigation patterns indicate that it was engaged in fishing, it simply did not catch that
much. Catch-estimations with a certain margin of error will therefore have to be established.
21 Cf. FAO VMS Guidelines, p. 5. Such hesitation is still evident in P. Bagnato v. Australian Fisheries
Management Authority, (Bagnato v. AFMA Case) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Australia), General
Administrative Division, Case No. N97/929, Decision of 30 January 1998, at para. 36. In D.A. Lane
(Fisheries Investigator) v. M.P. Wallace (GPS Case), Auckland District Court (New Zealand), Case No.
CRN 7004055329, Decision of 11 September 1998, the quality of evidence provided by GPS was
recognized (GPS is “a notorious scientific instrument”; pp. 26 and 33).
5
surveillance. This is addressed in Section 3.2. While Section 4 looks at the law of the sea in
relation to international legal aspects of satellite-based VMSs through ALCs, Section 5 looks
at aspects in space law which are more relevant to SRS.
3 Satellite-based VMSs and Fisheries Management
Current international law recognizes that the marine living resources in a coastal State’s
maritime zones are within its sovereignty or sovereign rights and can in principle be
managed, explored and exploited to the exclusion of other States.22 However, rather than
giving the coastal State a carte blanche to do whatever it sees fit, a wide range of
obligations seek to safeguard the interests of the international community. Depending, inter
alia, on the type of species, coastal States are to ensure through sustainable management
that their resources are not over-exploited, that appropriate account is taken of the objective
of optimum utilization and that they cooperate with other States in relation to transboundary
stocks.23 Furthermore, while the LOSC already subjected freedom of fishing on the high
seas to obligations on conservation and cooperation,24 flag States have in the 1990s
witnessed various global efforts to develop obligations that are both more stringent and
more specific.25 Clearly discernable in the evolution of the international law relating to
fisheries management is the continuously increasing attention to the fact that in many, if not
all, instances, sustainable fisheries management presupposes efforts in two key fields: data
gathering and ensuring compliance with its management objectives.26 Satellite-based VMSs
assist States in both.
3.1 Data Gathering
As a first step, sustainable fisheries management should gather reliable data on the effects
of harvesting on the targeted species which, after analysis, should lead to the adoption of
sustainable management measures. Decades of experience in fisheries management have
nevertheless shown that rather than this single-species approach, it is necessary to adopt a
multi-species approach in which effects of harvesting on both targeted species and
associated or dependent species should be taken into account.27 More recent even is the
                                               
22 See Section 4.3.1.1 for a discussion on maritime zones.
23 The importance of cooperation was most recently confirmed in the Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional
Measures) Cases (Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Nos. 3 and 4) (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v.
Japan), requests for provisional measures, Order of 27 August 1999, http://www.un.org/Depts/los) before
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). For the purpose of this article, management is
regarded as comprising both conservation and use (see the definitions of ‘conservation’ and ‘management’
used by S.N. Nandan, S. Rosenne (vol. eds.) and N.R. Grandy (ass. ed.), United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Volume III, The Hague/London/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1995, at p. 29). The objective of sustainability (Art. 2 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement) is used instead of the
qualification “proper” (Art. 61(2) LOSC). The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct uses “responsible fisheries” (Art.
2(c)), “effective conservation and management” (S. 6.1), “sustainable utilization” (Ss. 6.3 and 7.2.1), or
“long-term conservation and sustainable use” (S. 7.1.1).
24 See Art. 87(1)(e) in conjunction with Arts. 116-120.
25 All the global instruments mentioned in Section 1 are meant here. For an analysis see: E. Hey, Global
Fisheries Regulations in the First Half of the 1990s, 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law
459-490 (1996).
26 These two objectives are the core to the ‘System of Observation and Inspection’ within the framework of the
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR Convention; Canberra, 20
May 1980. In force 7 April 1981, http://www.ccamlr.org). For a discussion see R. Rayfuse, Enforcement of
High Seas Fisheries Agreements: Observation and Inspection under the Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 13 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law pp. 579-605 (1998),
in particular p. 588.
27 See, for example, Art. 61(3) LOSC; Art. 5(b) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. W.T. Burke, The New
International Law of Fisheries. UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 58 regards
associated species as including “incidental catches or by-catches” and dependent species as including
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advent of the ecosystem approach, which encompasses not only the effects of harvesting
on both targeted species and associated or dependent species, but also of associated
activities such as pollution.28 Although perhaps not management approaches proper,
community-based management29 and precautionary approaches30 provide for further
refinements to fisheries management.
Whichever management approach is pursued, the relevant global instruments all
recognize the key role of data gathering by obliging States to undertake such data
gathering31 and by stipulating that in taking management measures, account shall be taken
of the “best scientific evidence available”.32 Worth realizing is that data gathering is not
limited to biological/resources assessment data (including fishing trends, patterns,
interdependencies of stocks, and environmental aspects) but extends to data on fishery
capacity (fishermen, boats and gear) and social and economic data on the harvesting,
processing and marketing sections of fisheries.33 As should be clear from this enumeration,
data gathering requires conducting scientific research in many cases, but not all.34
The standard which scientific evidence should meet is commonly set at “best (…)
available”, which recognizes the difficulty of data gathering for the purpose of fisheries
management. These difficulties do not only originate from humanity’s limited knowledge of
the marine environment or the technical and economic aspects of fishing practices, but point
to any constraint, be it time, financial or capacity, which is experienced by fisheries
management authorities. Uncertain, unreliable or inadequate scientific data necessitates at
any rate that proper account should be taken of the precautionary principle.35 Obviously,
assessing whether a fisheries management authority adequately complies with its data
gathering duties is an extremely difficult task for any management approach but above all
for ecosystem management.36
It is also worth pointing out that in deciding upon certain management measures, all
gathered data must be weighed simultaneously, without any guidance on the weight of each
individual data-category. Closely related thereto is the fact that, although restrained by
obligations to prevent over-exploitation and to promote optimum utilization (where relevant),
fisheries management authorities are still left with a wide discretion in deciding upon the
preferred management objective.37
                                                                                                                                                 
“predator-prey or more distant food, or other biological relationships”. However, Arts. 5(f), 6(3)(d) and 6(5)
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement clearly treat ‘non-target’ species distinct from associated or dependent
species.
28 See, for example, Art. 5(d) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement; para. 17.71 Agenda 21.
29 See The State of the World Fisheries and Acquaculture. 1998, Rome, FAO, 1999 (referred to as: SOFIA
1998), at Box 11.
30 See Arts. 5(c) and 6 (Annex II) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement; Ss. 6.5 and 7.5 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
31 For example, Arts. 5(j and k), 9(d), 10(d, e, f and g), 14 and Annex I to the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement; S.
7.4 and Art. 12 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
32 For example, Art. 61(3) LOSC; Art. 5(b) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement; Ss. 6.4, 7.1.1 and 7.4.1 1995 FAO
Code of Conduct.
33 Art. 61(5) LOSC enumerates “scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics and other data
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks”. See also paras. (3) and (4) of the same provision. Art. 14(1)(a)
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement refers to “scientific, technical and statistical data” (see also Arts. 1(1), 3 and 4
of Annex I). The Introduction to the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct refers to “the nutritional, economic, social,
environmental and cultural importance of fisheries” (see also Art. 2(a)).
34 The term ‘scientific research’ is preferred above ‘marine scientific research’ (MSR). The latter term, which is
inter alia governed by Part XIII of the LOSC, is defined by A.H.A. Soons, Marine Scientific Research and
the Law of the Sea, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute/Deventer, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers,
1982, at p. 6 as “any study or related experimental work designed to increase man’s knowledge of the
marine environment. Thus, it encompasses any scientific work, wherever carried out, having the marine
environment as object” (footnote omitted; see also pp. 118-125).
35 Art. 6(2) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. This does certainly not automatically mean that fishing is not
allowed.
36 Cf. Burke 1994, supra note 27, at p. 57.
37 This is, inter alia, reflected in the words: “as qualified by (…) economic factors, including the economic
needs of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing States” in Art. 61(3)
LOSC. Instead of aiming for maximum sustainable yield, it could therefore be decided to strive for straight
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Through the monitoring of vessel movements, the ability to cross-check these data with
catch-statistics and the wide range of other information which can be transmitted, satellite-
based VMS thus assist management authorities in complying with their data-gathering
obligations under international law.
3.2 Ensuring Compliance and MCS
In light of the already identified tendency of marine capture fisheries to lead to over-
exploitation and economic inefficiency, the significance of ensuring compliance with fisheries
management can hardly be overstated. Ensuring compliance is generally associated with
‘monitoring, control and surveillance’ (MCS). Although many instruments make standard
reference to the MCS of fisheries, definitions of the individual elements are often lacking.
Although the term ‘monitoring’ is not defined in the LOSC, it nevertheless appears in Articles
202, 204, 205, and 206. Article 204, entitled “Monitoring of the risks or effects of pollution”,
is particularly interesting since paragraph (1) mentions several possible methods by which
environmental impact can be monitored, viz. observing, measuring, evaluating and
analyzing. Paragraph (2) stipulates furthermore that States shall keep the effects of certain
activities “under surveillance”, which could be interpreted as meaning that surveillance is
(sometimes) part of the monitoring effort. The leading commentary on the LOSC cites an
official of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission who indicates that “monitoring
is understood as repeated observations following the same methods at given sites.”38
Specifically for the context of fisheries the following definitions have been suggested:
monitoring: the continuing requirement for the measurement of fishing effort characteristics
and catches
control: the legal framework within which the resource must be exploited, i.e.,
management schemes
surveillance: those measures required to ensure compliance with the regulations formulated
under ‘control’39
The “measures required to ensure compliance” are presumably intended to cover the whole
range of enforcement measures, viz. boarding, (physical) inspection, arrest and judicial
proceedings.40 Not too much emphasis should be put on distinguishing between the different
components of MCS, if only because they do not fit to all specific circumstances.41 As the
purpose of MCS is “to ensure that management measures, once agreed and adopted by a
                                                                                                                                                 
economic need (whether optimal profit or optimal employment) or protein need (cf. P. Flewweling, An
Introduction to Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Systems for Capture Fisheries, FAO Fisheries
Technical Paper No. 338, Rome, FAO, 1994, p. 30; see also Art. 24 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement). The fact
that Art. 61(2) LOSC links scientific data to an obligation of “taking into account” also reflects the
predominance of the wider management context (cf. Burke 1994, supra note 27, at p. 56).
38 Cited by S. Rosenne and A. Yankov (vol. eds.), N.R. Grandy (ass. ed.), M.H. Nordquist (ed.-in-chief), United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. A Commentary, Volume IV, Dordrecht/Boston/London,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, p. 111, n. 2.
39 FAO Doc. CECAF/TECH/81/35, Report of the Consultation on Monitoring, Control and Surveillance, Dakar,
FAO, 1981 (as cited by M. Cirelli and A. Van Houtte, Legal Aspects of Cooperation in Monitoring, Control
and Surveillance in the Southwestern Indian Ocean, in: ‘1996 Mauritius Workshop’, supra note 11, at p. 77).
Slightly different definitions are used in FAO Doc. FAO/GCP/INT/344/NOR, Report on an Expert
Consultation on MCS for Fisheries Management, Rome, FAO, 1981 (as cited by Flewweling 1994, supra
note 37, at p. 7). Note that elsewhere (p. 9), Flewweling seems to follow the other definitions). See also Art.
5(l) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement which, in relation to MCS, simply refers to implementation and
enforcement. However, S. 7.1.7 1995 FAO Code of Conduct refers to “fisheries monitoring, surveillance,
control and enforcement” (Ss. 7.7.3 and 8.1.4 are more or less identical).
40 See Art. 73(1) LOSC.
41 For example, the Preamble to EC Council Regulation No 2847/93 (for full citation see Section 6.2) appears
to give ‘control’ a meaning with is more oriented towards enforcement (see the 5th and 9th ‘Whereas’). This
could be due to the fact that in Community law, ‘control’ is generally associated with enforcement.
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competent authority, are implemented fully and expeditiously”,42 MCS should properly be
regarded as covering the whole range of measures aimed at the implementation of fisheries
management goals.43 Moreover, even if a competent fisheries authority would succeed in
reaching consensus on a distinction, there is always a risk that over-rigid adherence thereto
negatively affects cooperation and, consequently, leads to duplication of effort and/or
inefficiency.
Satellite-based VMSs are therefore an important tool in efforts on MCS and, as Section
3.1 indicated, also contribute to data gathering. Whereas devoting adequate effort to MCS is
in principle in the own interest of a fisheries management authority, there may be a
multitude of reasons behind a failure to do so. Limited financial resources could be one of
these but, for instance, also the fact that coastal States managing fisheries in their own
maritime zones may not perceive this ‘own interest’ in the same way as flag States involved
in a loosely operating regional high seas fisheries management mechanism. Partly for this
reason, the relevant global instruments impose obligations on States to engage in MCS in
general44 and (satellite-based) VMSs in particular.45
The surveillance component of MCS can be conducted in a variety of ways. In addition
to satellite-based VMSs and the more traditional forms of VMSs mentioned in Section 2,
surveillance could for example take place in ports of landing, at auctions, or by tracing fish
and fishproducts. Singling out one of these forms of surveillance will never be successful as
each has its pros and cons. For example, on-board inspections at sea are costly and can be
dangerous due to weather circumstances or aggressive fishing-crews. In contrast with in-
port inspections, however, the fish actually on board or in the process of being caught, the
handling of the gear, the processing and storage and verification of the processes for
handling waste can all be much better monitored.46 Therefore, a mix of various forms of
surveillance will have to be used that is tailored to the regulatory area. For that purpose the
following factors could be taken into account:47
•  the size of the regulatory area, the part in which the actual fishing takes place and
the topography of the coastline;
•  the type of stocks and their level of exploitation;
•  the type and size of fishery, i.e. industrial/artisanal or domestic/foreign;
•  the nature and extent of infringements and the effectiveness of flag State control (if
relevant);
•  other social and economic considerations, such as the human and financial
resources available for enforcement in relation to the fisheries’ revenue in social and
economic terms;
•  the (lack of) support of stakeholders in fisheries for certain types of VMS;48
                                               
42 FAO Doc. COFI/97/INF.6, Essential Role of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in Fisheries Management,
December 1996.
43 Cf. B. Hersoug and O. Paulsen, Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in Fisheries Management, Windhoek,
University of Namibia, 1996, p. 1. Flewweling 1994, supra note 37, at p. 7 submits that MCS “includes the
implementation of operations necessary to effect an agreed policy and plan for oceans and fisheries
management”. The abbreviation MCS would therefore seem to perform a similar function as the phrase
“prevent, reduce and control pollution” which recurs continuously in the LOSC, leading E.J. Molenaar,
Coastal State Jurisdiction over Vessel-Source Pollution, The Hague/Boston/London, Kluwer Law
International, 1998, p. 2, n. 5 to observe that “As a whole this phrase is probably intended to cover all
possible measures to combat pollution, in whatever phase”.
44 See, for instance, para. 17.67 Agenda 21; Arts. 5(l), 10(h) and 18 and Art. 6 (Annex I) 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement; Ss. 6.10, 7.1.7, 7.7.3 and 8.1.4 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
45 Inter alia in Arts. 5(j) and 18(3)(e and g(iii)) and Arts. 5 and 6 (Annex I) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement; S.
7.7.3 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
46 Cf. Flewweling 1994, supra note 37, at p. 39.
47 Predominantly based on FAO Doc. COFI/97/INF.6, para. 2 (supra note 42).
48 A relevant factor in relation to satellite-based VMSs is the possibility of other applications (see infra).
9
•  the potential for successful cooperation with other States at a regional or sub-
regional level; and
•  the political will and commitment to make optimal use of the chosen VMS.
The cost-effectiveness assessment of these and perhaps a number of other
considerations49 should ultimately lead to the optimum surveillance mix. Sadly enough, it so
appears that an accurate assessment is only feasible with information obtained through
MCS. At least potentially, choices could therefore be guided by unfounded perceptions of
the causes of identified problems, for example by exclusively accusing foreign, and not
national, fishermen of over-fishing or illegal fishing.50 As a rule of thumb, it seems safe to
say that satellite-based VMSs are more appropriate for industrial than for artisanal fishing,
as the latter commonly involves a large number of fishers, mixed gears and landing points.
Arguably, a successfully operating satellite-based VMS (with or without SRS or OHR)
will work as a deterrent, thereby permitting diminished use of traditional means of
surveillance.51 Enhanced peer pressure by those having to install ALCs could also improve
overall compliance. Appropriate consideration should likewise be given to other applications
of satellite-based VMSs than those under discussion. The use of ALCs will often also enable
two-way communication and thereby provide fishing operators with applications such as
SafetyNET (designed to promulgate maritime safety information) or FleetNET (news and
weather broadcasts, market quotations etc.).52 Moreover, SRS could be used for a wide
range of military and non-military uses, for example vessel detection for other purposes
(smuggling), detection of marine pollution or algae blooms, coastal zone and forest
management and collating climate and meteorological information.53
3.3 Integrating Satellite-based VMSs in Fisheries Management
Once a fisheries management authority has taken the decision to use a satellite-based
VMS, it will be necessary to tailor the system to its needs. A primary consideration would be
the system’s purpose: data gathering, ensuring compliance or both. This choice will be
decisive for the way in which the system is to be integrated in the framework of fisheries
management. Subsequently, the operational requirements of the satellite-based VMS will
have to be determined, for example the type of system (Argos, Inmarsat-C etc.) and ALC,
the scope of application (geographically and type(s) of ships) and the type of information
transmitted (identity, location, frequency, addressee, etc.).
Secondly, apart from complementing satellite-based VMSs with other forms of
enforcement, it will have to be incorporated in the legal framework of fisheries management,
or the control component in MCS. This would require for example:
•  licensing;
•  requirements on vessel marking and identification;
•  catch reporting by logbook or otherwise;
                                               
49 A rather sensitive issue in relation to satellite-based VMSs is the aspect of security of information. Not only
will those actually involved in fishing fear unfair competition but, if applied between two or more States, this
would also more clearly reveal those States’ enforcement commitment. For a cost-effectiveness
assessment of VMS, see the Bagnato v. AFMA Case, supra note 21.
50 Cf. Flewweling 1994, supra note 37, at p. 4.
51 FAO VMS Guidelines, pp. 6-7. The EC believes it will lead to “an increase of 20% in the effectiveness of
marine surveillance, which has an estimated cost of MEuro 100” (Effective Monitoring to Ensure
Sustainable Fisheries, http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg14/info/ controle_en.htm, 19 May 1999, p. 10). Similarly,
M.W. Lodge, The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency and Legal Aspects of Fisheries Monitoring, Control
and Surveillance, in: ‘1996 Mauritius Workshop’, supra note 11, at p. 162 observes that “[c]apital costs are
much lower than the cost of a surface patrol vessel or aircraft”.
52 Cf. Fitzpatrick 1997, supra note 14, at p. 125.
53 Jansen 1999, supra note 15, at p. 6.
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•  prescribing fixed ports of landings; and
•  controlling transshipments.54
Without overstepping the limits set by applicable international law,55 enactments should be
unambiguous, regarded as acceptable by those regulated56 and conducive to effective and
easy enforcement. Penalties should be adequate in severity to deter violations. More
specifically related to satellite-based VMSs, the use of logbooks and ALCs should be
underpinned by a number of obligations aimed at avoiding obstruction of regulatory efforts.57
Not observing these obligations could be regarded as separate offenses. In addition, a
responsible use could be made of a rebuttable presumption of guilt, requiring the alleged
offender to establish its innocence.58 Closely related thereto is the recommendation that due
consideration should be given to the categorization of regulatory offenses. In many legal
systems criminal law usually demands a heavier standard of proof in comparison with civil or
administrative law.59
Finally, the pivotal role of one particular aspect cannot be emphasized enough:
confidentiality and security of information is essential for the success of satellite-based
VMSs. In many fisheries, the possibility that near real-time location and/or catch data ends
up in the hands of (non-participating) competitors is bound to have enormous impact on
acceptance and, if already in operation, on compliance and cooperation. Confidentiality and
security risks will in general increase when the VMS information is shared by more parties,
and appropriate measures will have to be taken to address these risks.60 The
aforementioned risks exist in every phase of transmission and all those involved - States,
companies and organizations alike - should exercise the utmost diligence on this issue. This
may, for instance, require the enactment of legislation to counter breaches of confidentiality
or security.
This does not necessarily mean that fisheries management authorities should have
exclusive access to the information transmitted by ALCs. The applicable legal framework
may guarantee others a right of access as well. One situation which springs to mind is
where location data are essential in criminal investigations for non-fisheries offences, for
example smuggling.61 Moreover, it may not always be objectionable that operators whose
vessels participate in the VMS have access to certain information as well. While access to
near real-time data will in many types of fisheries be out of the question, periodical access
to the overall results of the analysis of transmitted information could assist in more effective
fishing (more catch in less or shorter fishing trips). Disclosure of the latter information is of
course only recommended if adequate measures to prevent over-fishing are in place. Again,
                                               
54 For transshipments see Section 4.3.1.3.
55 See for example the restrictions discussed in Section 4.3.1.4.
56 See S. 7.1.10 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
57 The FAO VMS Guidelines, pp. 24-27 discuss the following ways of obstructing satellite-based VMSs:
blocking transmission at the antenna; disruption of power supply; physical removal of ALC; duplication of
ALC; and transmission of false position.
58 See D. Freestone, The Burden of Proof in Natural Resources Legislation. Some Critical Issues for Fisheries
Law, FAO Legislative Study No. 63, Rome, FAO, 1998. Freestone refers on p. 8 to S. 15(1) of the 1979
Control of Foreign Fishing Vessels Decree of the Seychelles, which provides that fish found on board a
vessel within its maritime zones is presumed to have been caught therein. Under subsection (2), this
presumption can be rebutted if prior to entry into the EEZ, the fishing vessel makes a radio call in which it
indicates that it is exercising its right of free navigation through the EEZ, and notifies its proposed route and
quantity of fish on board. On p. 23 Freestone argues that this kind of presumption gives reason for concern.
See also the use of a reversal of burden of proof in Arts. 13(5a) and 28(g) EC Council Regulation No
2847/93, (consolidated text; see Section 6.2). See also W.T. Burke, Fisheries Regulations under Extended
Jurisdiction and International Law, Rome, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 223, 1982, p. 15.
59 For example in the United States. We are grateful to Mr. P. Ortiz from the United States National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for his views on this point.
60 For an example of such measures see Attachment V to the NEAFC Scheme (see Section 6.3).
61 One of the reasons contributing to the establishment of the New Zealand VMS was the inability to trace
trawlers that violated exclusion zones (see Section 4.3.1.1) and thereby caused extensive damage to
submarine telephone cables.
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it is imperative for the success of a satellite-based VMS that fishing operators accept and
have faith in the issue of access to information.
4 Satellite-based VMSs and the Law of the Sea
4.1 Flag, Coastal and Port States
An analysis of the scope of application of a satellite-based VMS should commence with
clarifying the distinction between the different actors involved in the exercise of jurisdiction
over fisheries. Within this domain, international law allocates jurisdiction to States acting in
different capacities: as flag, coastal or port States. It is of course very rare for States to
exercise jurisdiction in one single capacity only, e.g. as a flag State. They will commonly
exercise jurisdiction in all three capacities, even though their rights and obligations will vary
for each different capacity.62
While several definitions for the term flag State can be chosen, the definition used here
is: the State whose nationality a particular vessel has.63 Unfortunately, the LOSC does not
define ‘port’ or ‘coastal’ State.64 Drawing on the definitions used in relation to vessel-source
pollution,65 it is submitted that the exercise of jurisdiction by coastal States concerns foreign
ships that engage in fishing activities66 in that coastal State’s maritime zones, whether or not
this foreign ship makes a call at one of that coastal State’s ports or anchorages. Jurisdiction
by port States, on the other hand, concerns activities that take place beyond the maritime
zones of the coastal State in which it is situated, viz. on the high seas or in another coastal
State’s maritime zones. This type of activity affects the interests of the coastal State
(merely) indirectly. Worth emphasizing is that port or coastal State jurisdiction always
implies jurisdiction over foreign vessels. Jurisdiction over a State’s own vessel implies acting
in the capacity as flag State.
With the relevant actors more clearly defined, the discussion will now proceed to flag,
coastal and port State approaches towards satellite-based VMSs.
4.2 Flag State Approaches
A flag State approach relies on the flag State’s competence to exercise jurisdiction over
ships that have chosen to bear that State’s nationality. As a condition for granting a ship its
nationality, the flag State can require it to install the necessary equipment for a satellite-
based VMS.67 The particular manner or extent in which flag States exercise their rights or
competences remains largely within their own discretion. The benchmark is therefore
commonly the flag State’s own constitutional framework and not so much international law.68
                                               
62 A State’s rights and obligations with respect to its own ships (flag State) is therefore potentially different in
case its ships fish on the high seas, compared to when they would fish in the flag State’s maritime zones
(coastal State). See the discussion after this footnote in the main text.
63 Cf. R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 3rd ed.,
1999, p. 257. The right to fly a flag and the ship’s nationality are linked in Art. 91(1) LOSC which, inter alia,
provides: “Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly”. Art. 91(1) LOSC
mentions another possible definition, viz. the State in whose territory the ship is registered.
64 In the LOSC ‘coastal State’ appears only in relation to the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and the
continental shelf, but not with respect to straits, archipelagos, the high seas, the regime of islands, enclosed
or semi-enclosed seas, the right of access of landlocked States to and from sea, and freedom of transit.
65 See Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at pp. 91-95.
66 See Section 4.3.1.3.
67 See Art. 91(1) LOSC.
68 See, for example, the Bagnato v. AFMA Case, supra note 21, in which the Applicant contested the need for
a VMS. After a cost-effectiveness analysis of VMS, Deputy President McMahon decided that the
requirement to install ALCs “is the correct and preferable decision” (para. 52).
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Rather than being only characterized in terms of competence, however, international law
also imposes a wide range of obligations on the flag State. Pursuant to Article 94 LOSC a
flag State has the obligation to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over ships flying its
flag.69 Although the ship’s location is essentially irrelevant, the spatial scope of coastal State
jurisdiction (which leads to concurrent jurisdiction) implies that the high seas are of
paramount importance. Neither this general norm nor the norms identified in Section 3.2 that
more specifically relate to MCS, amount to a requirement to ensure that ships install ALCs.70
If support for such an obligation at the global level might materialize in the future is difficult
to say. While global coverage would have the advantage of minimizing unfair competition,
securing agreement on an acceptable measure of uniformity in performance standards,
including data formats, may turn out to be an enormous task. Not only are Argos, Eutelsat
and Inmarsat-C equipment currently not exactly compatible,71 deciding which types of
vessels and/or fisheries should be covered would be particularly difficult.
Just how difficult such decisions are can be seen in the ongoing efforts of the Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC) and its Sub-committee on the Safety of Navigation (NAV) of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), who are in the process of securing agreement on
the carriage requirements of a universal automatic identification system (AIS). This system
is aimed at enhancing the safety of navigation and pollution prevention,72 and could rely on
any kind of communication, including satellite. The MSC agreed that “only one universal AIS
should be implemented on a long-term basis”, but is not yet near to this objective.73
In this context mention should also be made of the 1993 Protocol to the International
Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels (Torremolinos Convention).74 Its Chapter IX,
‘Radiocommunications’, contains regulations for fishing vessels of 45m in length and over,
including provisions for equipment that makes use of certain satellite communications
systems, such as Inmarsat and COSPAS-SARSAT, which could be used or adapted for the
purpose under discussion. However, for this to happen the 1993 Protocol would first have to
enter into force and this seems to take some time yet.75 In fact, one of the reasons that the
Torremolinos Convention never entered into force was the great differences in design and
operation between ships. Nevertheless, many flag States have already voluntarily
proceeded to implement (parts of) the 1993 Protocol.
A satellite-based VMS would, in principle, enable flag States to follow their ships
anywhere on the globe.76 As this guarantees continuous monitoring, it would constitute a
                                               
69 Specifically in relation to fisheries, see Art. III 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, Art. 18(2) 1995 Fish
Stocks Agreement and S. 6.11 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
70 For example, Art. 18(g)(iii) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, which lists MCS as one of the measures which
flag State should take, refers to “the development and implementation of vessel monitoring systems,
including, as appropriate, satellite transmitter systems” (emphasis added). Similarly, the 1995 FAO Code of
Conduct’s Technical Guideline No. 1 (Fishing Operations), which is of course voluntary, confirms this by
observing that the flag State ‘authorization to fish’ “should contain” conditions with regard to vessel position
reporting and “could include a requirement” to install ALCs (at pp. 7 and 9, paras. 22 and 34).
71 Cf. Fitzpatrick 1997, supra note 14, at pp. 128 and 138.
72 AIS would inter alia facilitate identification of ships suspected of discharge violations. See IMO Docs. MSC
67/7/11 and MEPC 39/12.
73 IMO Docs. NAV 43/15, paras. 7.36-7.46; MSC 67/22, paras. 7.64-7.68; MSC 69/22/Add.1, paras. 5.77-5.81
and Annex 12 (Resolution MSC.74(69) and Annex 3)). By Resolution MSC.74(69), the MSC inter alia
adopted a “Recommendation on Performance Standards for an Universal Shipborne Automatic
Identification System (AIS)”. Carriage requirements for AISs were discussed in NAV 45 (September 1999)
and were included in Chapter V of SOLAS 74 as Regulation 19(1.5) (see IMO Doc. NAV 45/14/Add.1,
Annex 6). The revised Chapter V is expected to enter into force on 1 July 2002. Information kindly obtained
from V. Lebedev, IMO.
74 The Convention was adopted in Torremolinos, on 2 April 1977. The 1993 Protocol was also adopted in
Torremolinos, on 2 April 1993.
75 As at 31 December 1999 the 1993 Protocol had been ratified by 5 States. Entry into force will take place
one year after 15 States with at least an aggregate fleet of 14,000 vessels equivalent to approximately 50%
of today's world fishing fleet of vessels of 24 metres in length and over, have ratified the Protocol
(http://www.imo.org).
76 This approach is pursued by the EC.
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particularly strong commitment to the flag State’s duty to exercise effective jurisdiction and
control. However, if the transmitted information is much more extensive than identification
and location data and its vessels operate in another State’s maritime zones, the consent of
that coastal State may have to be sought. The use of on-board sensors, for example to
measure sea temperature or salinity, could at a certain point effectively amount to marine
scientific research (MSR) and thus be subject to Part XIII of the LOSC.77 Moreover, even
where it concerns merely position reports, the flag State and the coastal State can agree
that these data will be forwarded to the coastal State.
Enforcement by the flag State (with respect to its own ships) could, in principle, be
undertaken anywhere on the high seas and also within another State’s exclusive economic
zone (EEZ).78 In case a vessel is located within the sovereignty of another State’s,79 its flag
State is either required, but in any case advised, to consult that coastal State on the
appropriateness of action taken.
4.3 Coastal State Approaches
The key-issue which this Section seeks to address is to what extent coastal States can
require foreign vessels that engage in certain activities in their maritime zones to install
ALCs and to what extent enforcement would be permissive. The main emphasis will be on
the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, EEZ and continental shelf. No attention will be paid to
the contiguous zone as Article 33 LOSC does not permit the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction within its spatial limits. The wide enforcement powers over fisheries to which the
coastal State is entitled in the EEZ, would also render separate attention to the contiguous
zone in this context unnecessary. Finally, apart from the right of hot pursuit under Article
111 LOSC, no attention is given to coastal State enforcement powers on the high seas.80
A distinction is first of all made between prescription (legislative jurisdiction) and
enforcement. The discussion on prescription is then further subdivided into foreign fishing
vessels with licenses, foreign fishing vessels in lateral passage (without licenses), foreign
fishing support vessels and general limits to prescription. The first three of these
subsections investigate scenarios in which coastal States might wish to use their
prescriptive powers over foreign vessels. The fourth subsection deals more generally with
limits to prescription. Lastly, even though safeguards such as those incorporated in
paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of Article 73 LOSC are part and parcel of the jurisdictional
balance in the LOSC, their discussion is omitted as it would take up too much space.
4.3.1 Prescription
4.3.1.1 Foreign Fishing Vessels with Licenses
In its territorial sea, a coastal State exercises sovereignty and has pursuant to Article
21(1)(d) LOSC prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to “the conservation of the living
resources of the sea”. In addition, Article 19(2)(i) LOSC provides that a foreign ship which
engages in “any fishing activities” in the territorial sea loses its right of innocent passage.81
Obviously, this does not apply to those ships which have been authorized to fish. These two
                                               
77 See Section 5.
78 See Art. 92(1) LOSC, which applies through Art. 58(2) LOSC to the EEZ as it is not “incompatible with [Part
V on the EEZ]”.
79 For the maritime zones which fall under a State’s sovereignty see Section 4.3.1.1.
80 For a global instrument which deals with this issue see Arts. 19(1)(a), 20(6), 21 and 22 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement. For a more general discussion see M. Hayashi, Enforcement by Non-Flag States on the High
Seas Under the 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 9 Georgetown
International Environmental Law Review 1-36 (1996).
81 See also the discussion in Section 4.3.2.
14
provisions indicate that the coastal State is permitted to impose any reasonable type of
requirement as a pre-condition for fishing in the territorial sea, including the fitting of ALCs.
The situation with respect to the archipelagic waters which can be established in
accordance with Article 47 LOSC, is quite similar to the regime in the territorial sea. Articles
2(1) and 49(1) LOSC recognize the archipelagic State’s sovereignty over its archipelagic
waters, while Article 52(1) upholds the right of innocent passage in accordance with Part II,
Section 3 (the regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea). The observations and
conclusions in relation to Articles 19(2)(i) and 21(1)(d) made in the previous paragraph
would therefore apply in principle mutatis mutandis. However, whereas Article 49(2)
provides that sovereignty extends to the resources in the archipelagic waters, Article 51(1)
emphasizes that:
Without prejudice to article 49, an archipelagic State shall respect existing agreements with other
States and shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the
immediately adjacent neighbouring States in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters. The
terms and conditions for the exercise of such rights and activities, including the nature, the extent
and the areas to which they apply, shall, at the request of any of the States concerned, be
regulated by bilateral agreements between them. Such rights shall not be transferred to or shared
with third States or their nationals.82
The archipelagic State is thus held to respect traditional fishing rights and barred from
unilaterally regulating fishing by foreign fishing vessels that exercise such rights. However,
once the archipelagic State would make a request for regulation through bilateral
agreements, Article 51(1) does not give the other States concerned much room to ignore
such a request, provided of course the demands of the archipelagic State are reasonable.
Much in this context will also depend on what the States concerned regard as “traditional
fishing rights”. In case the States agree it is a more or less static concept, the catches will
presumably not be substantial and the need for ALCs questionable.
Apart from the regime of innocent passage, the LOSC contains two other regimes which
grant rights of navigation through areas under State sovereignty, viz. the regimes of transit
passage and archipelagic sea lanes (ASLs) passage.83 Although ships of all States enjoy
these navigational rights, they do not affect the sovereignty of strait States and archipelagic
States over the resources in such areas.84 When exercising their rights of transit or ASLs
passage, ships shall comply with the various requirements enumerated in Article 39(1 and
2). Relevant to our subject is the obligation to “refrain from any activities other than those
incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit”.85 It is widely accepted
that the reference to the ‘normal mode’ was explicitly included for military purposes, e.g.
formation steaming and submarines proceeding submerged. No support exists for the view
that the ‘normal mode’ would allow foreign fishing vessels to engage in fishing without
having to obtain licenses. This would also be inconsistent with the strait and archipelagic
States’ competence to adopt laws and regulations relating to transit and ASLs passage “with
respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear”.86
Consequently, the rights of transit and ASLs passage do not effect the strait or archipelagic
State’s sovereignty with respect to regulating fisheries, including the requirement to install
ALCs.
In its EEZ a coastal State has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing”87 the living resources therein. In return for granting
foreign fishing vessels access to the surplus in the total allowable catch (TAC), Article 62(4)
                                               
82 See also Art. 47(6).
83 The regime of transit passage is incorporated in Section 2 of Part III, which is concerned with Straits used
for International Navigation. ASLs passage is included in Part IV on Archipelagic States.
84 Arts. 34(1) and 49(4). The regimes of transit and ASLs passage also grant rights of overflight to aircraft.
85 Art. 54 in Part IV makes Art. 39 mutatis mutandis applicable. Art. 53(3) also uses “the normal mode”.
86 Arts. 42(1)(c) and Art. 54 (the latter by cross-reference).
87 Art. 56(1)(a) LOSC.
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LOSC permits a coastal State to set “terms and conditions”.88 Subparagraph (e) recognizes
that this would cover ALCs by explicitly permitting the coastal State to enact laws and
regulations which require foreign vessels to provide “vessel position reports”.89
A special situation arises in relation to “living organisms belonging to sedentary species”
on the coastal State’s continental shelf.90 The regime for such species is a lex specialis to
the regime of other marine living resources in a coastal State’s EEZ.91 Due to the possibility
of a legal continental shelf which extends beyond the EEZ,92 a coastal State’s sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting these species would extend with it. These
sovereign rights give coastal States the authority to require that foreign vessels licensed to
harvest these species carry ALCs.
A regulatory measure with considerable potential for satellite-based VMSs are so-called
‘exclusion zones’ for the purpose of fisheries management. Within exclusion zones, the
mere presence of fishing vessels subject to VMS constitutes an offense, unless justified by
force majeure or the like.93 Exclusion zones are thus considerably more onerous but also
more effective than closed areas, as it is unnecessary to prove fishing activity. This could of
course lead to a separate conviction if such evidence would also be available. Since the
prohibition to transit exclusion zones, except through designated corridors, applies only to a
specified group of licensed fishing vessels, domestic or foreign, the navigational rights and
freedoms of other vessels remain unaffected. Such movement restrictions on licensed
vessels would normally be within the coastal or flag State’s competence.
4.3.1.2 Foreign Fishing Vessels in Lateral Passage
The situation for foreign fishing vessels not authorized to fish in a coastal State’s maritime
zones is, from the perspective of prescription, altogether different from ships with licenses. It
may be evident that upon violating the coastal State’s laws and regulations by fishing in
either the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters or the EEZ, the ship will be subject to
enforcement action. This aspect will be discussed in Section 4.3.2. Rather, the question to
be addressed here is whether or not ships without a license can be required to install ALCs
                                               
88 A right to access to the surplus in the TAC does not exist in relation to the other maritime zones. In fact, the
obligations on conservation and utilization of marine living resources incorporated in Arts. 61 and 62 are
only explicitly applicable to the EEZ.
89 Cf. the view of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs (DOALOS)
in IMO Doc. LEG 70/7, para. 27 and the United States in IMO Doc. LEG 70/7/1, para. 7. See the discussion
in the 70th session of IMO’s Legal Committee (LEG) in IMO Doc. LEG 70/10, paras. 90-91.
90 Art. 77(4) LOSC defines these as: “organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or
under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the
subsoil”. Churchill and Lowe 1999, supra note 63, at p. 142 argue that while agreement exists that this
includes species such as oysters, clams and abalone, whether it also covers crabs and lobsters remains
controversial. But see J.M. Van Dyke, Modifying the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: New Initiatives on
Governance of High Seas Fisheries Resources: the Straddling Stocks Negotiations, 10 International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 219-227 (1995), at pp. 221-222, who refers to a dispute between
Canada and the United States on the proper categorization of abalone.
91 See Arts. 56(3) and 77 LOSC. This also means that the coastal State obligations to prevent over-
exploitation and to promote the objective of optimum sustainable yield pursuant to Arts. 61 and 62
respectively, are not applicable either; at least not based on the LOSC. This inter alia means that other
States have no right to access to a surplus, if any (cf. E. Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of
Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 49).
92 See Art. 76 LOSC.
93 This regulatory measure is already in operation in Australia (Commonwealth, Queensland and Western
Australia; Tasmania is preparing to have it incorporated in its legislative framework). At the beginning of
2000, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) was preparing to go to court for a case in
which a fishing vessel was located in an exclusion zone. The fact that its navigation pattern suggests that it
was engaged in fishing will probably be used to justify steeper penalties but not to prove a separate
violation of fishing (information kindly provided by P. Gallagher, AFMA, January 2000).
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as a pre-condition for the mere transit (lateral passage) through maritime zones, as such a
requirement could be inconsistent with applicable rights of navigation.94
The competence of coastal States in the territorial sea pursuant to Article 21(1)(d)
LOSC has already been cited above. Foreign ships are, under paragraph (4) of that same
provision, held to comply with these laws and regulations when exercising their right of
innocent passage. However, paragraph (2) contains an important restriction on the coastal
State’s legislative powers by stipulating that “laws and regulations shall not apply to the
design, construction, manning or equipment [CDEM] of foreign ships unless they are giving
effect to generally accepted international rules or standards”. It is important to note that this
limitation applies to all CDEM standards, irrespective of the purpose of regulation.95
The situation in archipelagic waters (beyond ASLs) is, due to the applicability of the
regime of innocent passage, essentially identical to that in the territorial sea. With respect to
areas subject to transit or ASLs passage, the LOSC does not contain a provision similar to
Article 21(2) which would restrict strait and archipelagic State jurisdiction to ‘generally
accepted’ CDEM standards. However, in view of the underlying rationale of these regimes,
which ensures more extensive rights of navigation in comparison with the territorial sea sec,
such a restriction must be presumed. The strait and archipelagic State prescriptive
jurisdiction “with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the stowage
of fishing gear” cannot therefore be interpreted as conferring wider powers compared to
what coastal States would have under the regime of innocent passage.96
Within the EEZ a coastal State has the sovereign rights already cited before. Its
legislative competence with regard to equipment standards is, pursuant to Article 211(5)
LOSC, only possible “for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels”. In
the absence of other provisions on equipment standards, it must be presumed that coastal
State powers are at any rate not more extensive than in the territorial sea.
In light of what has just been discussed, it is clear that the question which must be
answered is whether or not the requirement to install ALCs must be regarded as an
equipment (CDEM) standard. If this is answered in the positive,97 this implies that coastal
States cannot interfere with foreign ships merely exercising their rights of navigation through
that coastal State's maritime zones. This would be different if initiatives at the international
level have led this requirement to become ‘generally accepted’, but the discussion in Section
4.2 already noted that this situation has not yet materialized.98 For ships transiting the EEZ,
the LOSC simply does not even contain a basis for imposing a ‘generally accepted’
equipment standard for the purpose of fisheries management.
An argument in support of the view that the ALC requirement is not an equipment
standard, is that all an ALC really does is facilitate the verification of compliance with lawful
national and/or international regulatory efforts. Moreover, although installing ALCs brings
along certain costs, they do not genuinely constrain the behavior or movement of ships;
thereby leaving the essence of navigational rights unaffected. Apart from the costs-aspect,
the requirement to install ALCs is largely similar to asking unlicensed foreign fishing vessels
to give prior notification of entry into a coastal State’s maritime zones even if they merely
                                               
94 The phrase “rights of navigation” is used here in the widest sense: of comprising all the passage rights
defined in the LOSC.
95 This is an important distinction with Art. 211(5) LOSC which only concerns the “prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from vessels”. Similarly, the extensive coastal State powers under Art. 234 LOSC within
ice-covered areas can only be exercised with respect to vessel-source pollution.
96 Art. 42(1)(c) LOSC. See also Art. 39(2) which requires ships in transit passage to comply with generally
accepted international regulations, procedures and practices for safety at sea and the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution. This is a wider obligation in comparison with Art. 21(4).
97 This view is inter alia held by Burke 1982, supra note 58, at p. 14.
98 For a discussion on the possibility of standards becoming ‘generally accepted’ without the involvement of a
competent international organization or general diplomatic conference (Arts. 21(2) and 211(6)(c) LOSC),
see Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at pp. 158-161.
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intend to transit.99 However, the coastal State’s power to request prior notification is an issue
fraught with controversy, particularly in relation to warships and ships carrying hazardous
cargo.100 Flag States are likely to oppose prior notification in the sphere of fisheries for the
simple reason that it might ‘spill over’ to other areas.101 In the sphere of vessel-safety and
pollution prevention, developments at IMO now enable coastal States to operate mandatory
ship reporting systems beyond the territorial sea, provided IMO approval is obtained.
Arguably, this implies that mandatory ship reporting systems that do not extend beyond the
territorial sea can be adopted without IMO approval.102 There seem to be no reasons why
this conclusion would not also apply if a ship reporting system would serve the purpose of
fisheries management.
In the context of fisheries, there may be considerations which allow for a balance of
jurisdiction which is even more favorable to the coastal State. With respect to the issue of
prior notification exclusively, account should first of all be taken of the fact that the coastal
State’s power to board foreign fishing vessels in its maritime zones, is not as limited as the
powers it would have in relation to vessel-source pollution. This is particularly true for the
EEZ. Secondly, poaching poses great difficulties to not only developing States but also more
general to States that have extensive ocean surfaces to monitor. Therefore, when the
impact on navigation caused by the requirement to give prior notification or the costs for
installing ALCs103 is balanced with the coastal State's loss of income in fisheries, appropriate
weight should be given to the consideration that the ultimate objective is that of ensuring
compliance with lawful national and/or international regulatory efforts.104
But while a case might with considerable difficulty be made for prior notification, whether
or not within the framework of ship reporting systems, just the costs-dimension of ALCs
already constitutes an unsurpassable hurdle. Finally, even a prior notification approach
would by many States be treated as excessive and coastal States wishing to adopt it would
therefore have to count on resistance.
4.3.1.3 Foreign Fishing Support Vessels
In addition to the distinction between national and foreign ships, and ships with or without a
license, the issue of types of ships also needs to be addressed. While it remains within the
coastal State’s discretion to impose the ALC requirement on certain specific types of fishing
vessels exclusively, or more generally on all fishing vessels engaged in a specific fishery,
                                               
99 Prior notification has to be distinguished from an incidental request for information as part of the exercise of
enforcement (see Section 4.3.2). Fitzpatrick 1997, supra note 14, at p. 133 regards prior notification or the
requirement to install ALCs as unproblematic, even going as far as submitting that “[t]he coastal State
should not unreasonably refuse permission for a foreign fishing vessel intent on innocent passage”. He
goes on by observing that “[f]urther requirements would be applicable in the case of vessels carrying
harpoon guns”. Relevant State practice already exists (see, for example, the requirement to give prior
notification of entry under S. 15(1) of the 1979 Control of Foreign Fishing Vessels Decree of the Seychelles
(supra note 58)). Burke 1982, supra note 58, at p. 13 submits that prior notification is reasonable whereas
he considers regulating navigating of fishing vessels in lateral passage by sea lanes or designated areas
commonly more objectionable (p. 12). France requires all fishing vessels and vessels carrying fish that wish
to transit the EEZs around its Terres australes , to notify entry and declare the amount of fish on board (Law
No. 96-609, of 5 July 1996, Art. 11-I, Ordinance No. 98-523, of 24 June 1998, Art. 2).
100 See E.J. Molenaar, Navigational Rights and Freedoms in a European Regional Context, in: ‘Navigational
Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea’, D.R. Rothwell and S. Bateman (eds.), The
Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 2000 (forthcoming).
101 Cf. Burke 1982, supra note 58, at p. 1.
102 Cf. Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at pp. 212-216. See also the discussion in note 132 infra.
103 Account should in fact be given to relative costs, which are considerably higher for artisanal fisheries in
comparison to industrial fisheries.
104 It is noteworthy that S.N. Nandan, S. Rosenne (vol. eds.) and M.H. Nordquist (ed.-in-chief), United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, A Commentary, Volume II, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 565 submit that the problem of illegal fishing “may require the coastal State to
take protective measures that unavoidably impact on passing vessels”.
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this is not necessarily the same with ships that are not themselves engaged in fishing but
give support to ships that do. As these ships could be used to evade fisheries management
regulation, not covering them would be a weak spot in the compliance effort. Conversely, a
definition of ‘fishing support vessels’ which is too broad risks being in conflict with rights of
other States in the maritime zones of the coastal State.
Rather than targeting fishing support vessels, however, the coastal State always has
another option: viz. to require that fishing vessels, while in the coastal State’s maritime
zones, shall not be assisted by fishing support vessels unless these latter vessels also
comply with certain requirements (e.g. installing ALCs).105 While it cannot be denied that this
stretches coastal State sovereignty or sovereign rights considerably, this does not
necessarily happen to the extent of amounting to an abuse of rights.106 Provided applicable
requirements such as necessity are met, the fact that this activity occurs within the coastal
State’s maritime zones and affects its sovereignty or sovereign rights seems to be a key-
consideration.
Each of the global instruments relevant to marine fisheries that has been adopted in the
1990s recognizes in one way or another that flag State obligations also extend to vessels
that are not engaged in fishing as such. Only the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement goes as
far as incorporating a definition. Article I(a) defines fishing vessel as “any vessel used or
intended for use for the purposes of the commercial exploitation of living marine resources,
including mother ships and any other vessels directly engaged in such fishing operations”.
Although Sections 6.10, 6.11 and 7.8.1 1995 FAO Code of Conduct distinguish “fishing
vessels” from “fishing support vessels”, definitions are not provided. Elsewhere the 1995
FAO Code of Conduct uses either “fishing operations” or “fishing activities”.107 The 1995
Fish Stocks Agreement contains references to both “fishing operations” and “fishing
activities”.108
The approaches in each of these global instruments clearly vary from each-other. For
that reason and due to the dissimilar scopes of application of these instruments, their nature
and their inter-relationships,109 it is difficult to arrive at a uniform definition. Ships used for
the processing of fish (so-called ‘klondykers’) would fall under the rather narrow definition in
Article I(a) 1993 Compliance Agreement either pursuant to “fishing operations” or to “mother
ships”. And even though ships used for the transshipment of fish seem at first sight not
covered by this definition, the Preamble to the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement explicitly
mentions that flag State duties extend to such vessels.110 Of some relevance is also that at
least one regional fisheries mechanism subjects ships used for the transshipment of fish to
the ALC requirement, albeit on an inter se basis only. 111
                                               
105 The Guinean regulatory approach scrutinized in the Saiga Cases (infra notes 116 and 121) before the
ITLOS did in fact also prohibit licensed fishing vessels from receiving fuel (Art. 4 Law L/94/007 of Guinea,
cited in the Saiga (Merits) Case, Judgment, para. 112; infra note 116). Judge Warioba, in his Dissenting
Opinion in the Saiga (Merits) Case, even holds that Art. 62(4)(a and h) LOSC would allow regulation for
customs (smuggling) purposes (see para. 76). Note that Art. 111(4) LOSC also envisages that enforcement
action can be taken against a mother ship.
106 See the discussion on abuse of rights in Section 4.4.1.
107 For “operations” see, for example, S. 1.3 and Art. 8; for “activities” see, for example, Ss. 6.11, 6.15 and
7.5.2. Note that S. 8.1.4 refers to “and related activities”.
108 For “operations” see, for example, the Preamble and Arts. 10(c), 16(2), and 17(2); for “activities” see, for
example, Arts. 5(j), 6(3)(c) and 17(3).
109 See, for example, Arts. 1 and 3 1995 FAO Code of Conduct.
110 W. Edeson, Towards Long-term Sustainable Use: Some Recent Developments in the Legal Regime of
Fisheries, in: ‘International Law and Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future Challenges’,
A. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 165-203, at p. 171 observes
that the definition of ‘fishing vessels’ proved to be rather contentious during the negotiations for the 1993
FAO Compliance Agreement. In his view the definition “excludes support vessels not directly engaged in
fishing operations”. On p. 174 he submits that the use of “fishing support vessels” in the 1995 FAO Code of
Conduct “stands in contrast to the much more restricted definition” in the 1993 FAO Compliance
Agreement.
111 Art. 1(d) NEAFC Scheme (see Section 6.3). See also S. 2 Coastal Fisheries Protection Act of Canada (see
Section 6.2 for sources).
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In the present context, however, the extent of coastal State powers is presumably more
relevant than ascertaining the precise scope of application of flag State obligations.
Appropriate weight should therefore be given to the distribution of jurisdiction between flag
and coastal States in the LOSC. While the LOSC often uses “fishing vessels” or “fishing”112
without offering definitions, it also refers to “fishing activities” in Article 19(2)(i) and simply
“vessels” in Article 73; the latter being the central coastal State enforcement provision for
fisheries already cited. Consequently, coastal State powers over vessels not engaged in
fishing as such should not a priori be ruled out.
One possible point of departure for a more thorough examination of the issue is to
examine the navigational rights of fishing support vessels. To avoid too much complexity,
discussion will be limited to the territorial sea and the EEZ.113
Persuading support appears to exist for the view that transshipment (of fish) cannot be
regarded as an exercise of the right of innocent passage for failure to meet the
requirements of passage in Article 18(2) LOSC. Transshipment disqualifies passage as
being “continuous and expeditious” and can neither be classified as “incidental to ordinary
navigation” or “force majeure”. As klondykers are also involved in transshipment they can be
treated on the same footing.114 The same applies where an even wider definition of ‘fishing
support vessel’ is pursued, viz. by including ships that provide support that is essentially
unrelated to fishing proper, for example food, water and other goods for the crew or fuel for
the vessel. For the purpose of this analysis we will call this activity ‘bunkering’. In conclusion,
on the grounds just submitted, both transshipment and bunkering are already disqualified as
exercises of innocent passage. This renders it in principle unnecessary to determine the
precise meaning of the phrases “any fishing activities” or “any other activity not having a
direct bearing on passage” in subparagraphs (i) and (l) of Article 19(2) LOSC respectively.
With respect to the EEZ, the question which must be answered is if transshipment or
bunkering is covered by relevant flag State rights. In view of Article 58(1) LOSC, it is clear
that only the clauses “freedom of navigation” or “other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships (…)” would
be relevant. A positive answer to this question would put such vessels basically under the
same regime as foreign fishing vessels without licenses. Unfortunately, the LOSC does not
offer definitions for these clauses and no other guidance is readily at hand.115 It will therefore
be up to institutions like the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)116 to
resolve these issues of interpretation.
But even if bunkering or transshipment could not be classified as ‘freedom of navigation’
or ‘uses associated with a ship’s operation’ (further: associated uses), it would still be
                                               
112 For “fishing vessels” see, for instance, Arts. 42(1)(c) and 62(4); for “fishing” see, for instance, Art. 62(4).
113 The situation in archipelagic waters beyond ASLs would, however, be essentially identical to the territorial
sea.
114 In addition, the processing of fish on board of klondykers could be regarded as a ‘fishing activity’ under Art.
19(2)(i).
115 Arguably, the regime of innocent passage distinguishes between an element of movement (Art. 18) and
activities undertaken during movement (Art. 19(2); see in particular subpara. (g)). However, this distinction
is not necessarily the appropriate one for the EEZ.
116 In the Saiga (Merits) Case (The M/V ‘Saiga’ Case (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea),
Judgment of 1 July 1999) before the ITLOS, Guinea argued that bunkering cannot be regarded as freedom
of navigation or an associated use, but rather as ‘commerce’ or a ‘commercial activity’ (Verbatim Records,
ITLOS/PV.99/14, p. 24, English Version; Judgment, para. 124). Judge Zhao, in his Separate Opinion in the
Saiga (Merits) Case, largely supports the Guinean view. Contra Separate Opinion Judge Vukas (para. 17).
The Separate Opinion of Judge Anderson refrains from taking a stand but emphasizes that the issue
depends on the specific situation in which bunkering takes place. Text of Judgment, Separate and
Dissenting Opinions and Verbatim Records available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los. D. Attard, The
Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 64 submits that due to
the lack of guidance in the LOSC, “whether a given activity, such as offshore servicing, is to be considered
as a ‘related’ lawful use or not, will depend largely on the coastal State”. Prima facie, Attard seems to
suggest that coastal States are reserved an interpretative role, but the context in which this phrase is
placed renders it rather ambiguous.
20
necessary to determine if international law provides coastal States with the competence to
regulate (including to prohibit) this behaviour. This approach is primarily relevant for the EEZ
because within a State’s territorial sovereignty restrictions are not to be presumed and no
right of innocent passage exists in casu. Also, it should be emphasized again that
transshipment or bunkering would be regulated for the purpose of fisheries management.117
The broad way in which Article 56(1)(a) LOSC defines a coastal State’s sovereign rights in
relation to marine living resources would not seem to raise problems for transshipment (and
thereby klondykers) as its link with fisheries is evident.118 Support for this exists in state
practice in which foreign ships used for the transshipment of fish are also made subject to
the ALC requirement.119
The matter of bunkering is more complicated because its link with fisheries is less
obvious. This has not stopped some States from regulate bunkering for the purpose of
fisheries management.120 In the Saiga (Prompt Release) Case,121 the ITLOS concluded that
“for the purpose of the present proceedings, the action of Guinea [the prohibition of
bunkering] can be seen within the framework of” Article 73 LOSC.122 Although this view has
been severely criticized directly or indirectly in all its Dissenting Opinions, it falls somewhat
short of actually classifying bunkering as falling under a coastal State’s “sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources” in its EEZ.123 One indication of
the scope of coastal State prescriptive jurisdiction for fisheries purposes is given by the non-
exhaustive list of issues which coastal States may regulate under Article 62(4) LOSC. On
this issue Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto observed in their Dissenting
Opinion in the Saiga (Prompt Release) Case:
                                               
117 Conversely, the main issue in the Saiga (Merits) Case is the exercise of jurisdiction by Guinea which
regulates bunkering (mainly, but not necessarily exclusively, of fishing vessels) for fiscal or customs
purposes. Jurisdiction was not asserted for the purpose of fisheries management, even though the
Judgment of the ITLOS in the Saiga (Prompt Release) Case asserted this, if only in the particular context of
the prompt release procedure (see infra in main text; see also the explicit rejection of this regulatory
purpose by Guinea in its Counter-Memorial in the Saiga (Merits) Case (paras. 106 and 108)). As the LOSC
does not explicitly refer to relevant coastal State rights or jurisdiction in the EEZ, Guinea was (in the Saiga
(Merits) Case) forced to rely on extensive interpretations of Art. 56(1)(a) and on “the customary principle of
the protection of its public interest against grave disadvantages” (the latter based on the reference to “other
rules of international law” in Art. 58(3) LOSC; see Verbatim Records, ITLOS/PV.99/15, p. 6 English
Versions, remarks by Professor Lagoni, Counsel for Guinea). The ITLOS eventually held that the exercise
of jurisdiction for the purpose of customs in the EEZ (beyond the contiguous zone) is not empowered by the
LOSC, nor by the “other rules of international law” in Art. 58(3) LOSC (Judgment, paras. 127-136). Judge
Warioba, in his Dissenting Opinion, fully supports the Guinean view in all its extremities, even though a
distinction between delivering and receiving fuel is not consistently made (paras. 62-91).
118 See also Art. 62(4)(h) LOSC which allows the coastal State to regulate the landing of all or part of the catch
in one of its ports. This would implicitly allow the coastal State to take a less onerous measure on
transshipment.
119 E.g. Arts. 11 and 28a EC Council Regulation No 2847/93 (consolidated text; see Section 6.2).
120 See, for instance, the definition of ‘related activities’ in S. 1(xlix)(c) 1998 Marine Living Resources Act of
South Africa (see Section 6.2) which reads: “refuelling or supplying fishing vessels, selling or supplying
fishing equipment or performing any other activity in support of fishing”. In addition, ‘fishing’ is defined in S.
1(xviii)(d) as “any operation in support or in preparation of any activity described in this definition”. See also
the definition of ‘fishing’ in S. 2(1) 1983 Fisheries Act of New Zealand (Fisheries Act, No. 14 of 1 October
1983, http://www.gplegislation.co.nz) which reads (in part): “and also includes any operation in support of or
in preparation for any activities described in this definition”. Foreign vessels intending to engage in
bunkering within the EEZ of New Zealand must register and apply for a license under S. 57(1) 1983
Fisheries Act (see also S. 60) and could be subject to the ALC requirement. More or less the same situation
exists under the 1991 Fisheries Management Act of Australia (see Section 6.2). For the definition of fishing
see S. 4 under (e) and the need to have a fishing license under S. 100.
121 The M/V ‘Saiga' Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment of 4 December 1997,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los.
122 Para. 71.
123 Art. 73(1) LOSC. Note that what the ITLOS defines in para. 56 of its Judgment as the question which must
be considered before the application for the Art. 292 procedure is admissable, comes far closer to
attributing bunkering as belonging under the coastal State’s sovereign rights under Art. 73. See also the
Dissenting Opinions of President Mensah, para. 21, and of Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto,
para. 20.
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Although this list is not meant to be fully comprehensive, it gives no indication that the
competences of the coastal State concerning fishing might encompass activities of merchant
ships, associated with the freedom of navigation, for the sole reason that they service fishing
vessels.124
An important consideration in support of this view would seem to be that the obligation to
comply with these coastal State laws and regulations in the chapeau of subparagraph (4), is
only directed at “[n]ationals of other States fishing” (emphasis added). And even though the
LOSC does not define this term, it has at any rate not opted for ‘fishing activities’, like in
Article 19(2)(i). On the other hand, while it cannot be denied that the list in Article 62(4) does
not refer to services rendered to fishing vessels, this is not necessarily conclusive in light of
its non-exhaustive character. Moreover, Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto’s
view is linked to the classification of bunkering as being “associated with the freedom of
navigation”, which is disputable. Finally, this view cannot be isolated from the context of the
Saiga Cases, which is jurisdiction for fiscal or customs purposes. It is also for that reason
that in giving its Judgment in the Saiga (Merits) Case, the ITLOS did not issue an obiter
dictum to resolve the controversy.125
If bunkering cannot be regarded as an activity which is an exercise of freedom of
navigation or an associated use, and is not covered by the coastal State’s jurisdiction under
the LOSC either, the issue becomes one of so-called ‘residual rights’. To address this
situation, Article 59 LOSC observes:
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to
other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the
coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of
the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
One way of resolving such a conflict would be through an international tribunal like the
ITLOS. Guidance on the possible outcome of such a conflict is given by the leading
commentary on the LOSC:
Given the functional nature of the exclusive economic zone, where economic interests are the
principal concern this formula would normally favor the coastal State. Where conflicts arise on
issues not involving the exploration for and exploitation of resources, the formula would tend to
favor the interests of other States or of the international community as a whole.126
If this view would be adhered to, coastal States would certainly be granted jurisdiction to
regulate bunkering for the purpose of fisheries management.127
                                               
124 Para. 22.
125 Judgment, paras. 137-138. If only because according to the minority in the Saiga (Prompt Release) Case,
that Judgment already contained too many obiter dictums. See also the observations by Judge Anderson in
his Separate Opinion in the Saiga (Merits) Case (under “Arrest of the Saiga”).
126 Nandan and Rosenne 1993, supra note 104, at p. 569.
127 See also the Separate Opinions in the Saiga (Merits) Case of Judges Vukas (para. 21) and Laing (paras.
55-56). Another interesting example is the regulation of anchoring beyond the territorial sea, by the United
States in the Flower Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary, which is around 115 nm from its coasts (15
Code of Federal Regulations § 922.122(2)). This raises a number of questions, for example if anchoring is
to be regarded as pollution in the sense of Art. 1(4) LOSC, and would thus have to be considered in the
framework of Art. 211(5) LOSC and the concept of ‘generally accepted’. The United States, however,
argues that regulatory action serves the purpose of resource protection and should be dealt with in the light
of Arts. 59 and 78 LOSC (see also Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at pp. 417-418).
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4.3.1.4 General Limits to Prescription
Even though coastal States are, based on either sovereignty or sovereign rights, thus
expressly permitted to impose terms and conditions on foreign vessels that wish to fish in
their waters or on their continental shelf, this regulatory competence cannot but have its
limits as well. In addition to the more general principle of abuse of rights already mentioned,
a limit is constituted by behavior occurring prior to entering the maritime zones of the coastal
State. As examples could be mentioned discharge or fishing violations128 or, more directly
relevant to this discussion, having the ALC switched on well in advance to entry.129
It is submitted that coastal State prescription cannot extend to prior behavior unless
international law recognizes the existence of a sufficiently close or substantial connection
with the coastal State.130 Such a basis of jurisdiction should be applicable between the
States involved. This could be a conventional norm or one which is based on customary
international law, for example under the effects or impact doctrine.131 With regard to the
requirement that ALCs are to be switched on well in advance to entering a coastal State’s
maritime zones, current international law does not seem to recognize such a basis132 and
the effects or impact doctrine would not seem suitable to such cases. The same arguments
would apply, mutatis mutandis, to a requirement to have ALCs switched on for a
considerable period of time after leaving a coastal State’s maritime zones.
Under these circumstances, therefore, the right to impose license-conditions is the only
basis of jurisdiction. Arguably, this basis is in principle insufficient and would amount to an
abuse of rights on account of the absence of necessity. However, were it just a matter of a
relatively short period of time or a short distance before or after entry in order to prevent
‘border-hopping’, the absence of necessity would be much harder to prove.133
In addition to having to be in compliance with the more specific international norms just
discussed, coastal State laws and regulations should also observe the principle of non-
discrimination. No relevant differences should therefore exist between foreign ships of
different nationality.134 A related issue is whether or not the principle of national treatment
applies, viz. the prohibition to substantially differentiate between regulations imposed on
national ships (acting as a flag State) and foreign ships that fish in the same area.135 It is
                                               
128 On discharge and fishing violations see Section 4.4.2.
129 See South Africa in Section 6.2. Not meant here are requirements to comply with certain CDEM standards,
which is dealt with under port State jurisdiction in Section 4.4.2.
130 See, for example, the Norwegian statement at the 17th Meeting of CCAMLR (1998), which expressed
concern over the undermining of flag State jurisdiction and advocated caution with respect to giving laws
extra-territorial application (CCAMLR-XVII, para. 5.8).
131 Under this doctrine, a State exercises jurisdiction over extra-territorial acts that have ‘significant effects’
within its territory (see Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at pp. 81-83).
132 Noteworthy in this context is the recent development within the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
where mandatory ship reporting systems which apply beyond the territorial sea can be adopted by IMO’s
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Adoption by the MSC thus provides the basis in international law (see
Regulation V/8-1 SOLAS 74 (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London, 1 November
1974, as amended. Entry into force on 25 May 1980), adopted by IMO Res. MSC.31(63) and entered into
force on 1 January 1996).
133 Van Dyke 1995, supra note 90, at p. 226 suggests that coastal States are able to impose a much wider
array of conditions for access to their EEZs, such as “compliance with non-discriminatory and consistent
management regulations in the areas outside the EEZ”. Norway, for example, may deny an application for a
license to fish in its maritime zones if the vessel or the vessel’s owner has taken part in unregulated fishing
on the high seas on a fish stock which is subject to regulation in Norway’s maritime zones or if this would
contravene regulatory measures laid down by RFMMs (CCAMLR-VIII, para. 5.18 (advance copy), and the
relevant Norwegian Working Paper, SCOI 99/19). However, this approach was apparently rejected by the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO; see comments by the EC in CCAMLR-XVIII/25, para.
2.44).
134 See, for example, Arts. 24(1)(b), 42(2), 54, and 119(3) LOSC.
135 The LOSC does not contain a directly relevant principle of national treatment, except for Art. 227 which
applies basically exclusively to Part XII on the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment (as
Art. 227 uses “against”, it is better to speak of national treatment instead of non-discrimination, which
concerns essentially differences between foreign ships).
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submitted that as a corollary to the coastal State’s competence to deny foreign vessels
access to its EEZ altogether,136 a less onerous use of its powers by ensuring more favorable
conditions for the coastal State’s own ships, would a fortiori be possible.137 However, even in
the absence of a legally binding and applicable principle of national treatment, it is certainly
not illusory that coastal State regulations are regarded as unfair and lead to responses by
other States. This could for instance occur in the form of special conditions being imposed
on that coastal State’s fishing ships or through (trade) sanctions imposed directly on that
State.
Another issue is that of a coastal State’s discretion in determining the type of satellite
system (e.g. Inmarsat or Argos) or ALC that foreign ships operating in its maritime zones
should use. This is understandably a concern for flag States as they are eager to avoid a
situation in which their vessels have to install more than one ALC if they wish to operate in
several coastal States. Although the trade-related aspects cannot be addressed here, a
choice for a preferred VMS would seem to be within a coastal State’s discretion. On the
other hand, it would generally be unreasonable and also unnecessary to accept only one
type of ALC, as long as its performance standards are satisfactory to the coastal State.138
Coastal States are at any rate urged to cooperate with flag States to minimize duplication.
Hopefully, developments in technology will soon enable the use of a single ALC for more
than one satellite system or a VMS using more than one satellite system.139
Something which should still be addressed is the extent to which coastal States that
determine terms and conditions for access are likely to observe the international legal
restraints that have been identified. A key-factor could be the world-wide growing demand
for access to fish stocks coupled to constantly shrinking catches. Under such circumstances
coastal States have considerable leverage and flag States will be anxious in emphasizing
conflict with international law as this might risk denial of access altogether. In case access
agreements are negotiated directly with foreign fishing operators, the willingness to
compromise in order to secure access may be even stronger, inter alia due to the absence
of concern on the impact of their behaviour on the formation of customary international
law.140
4.3.2 Enforcement
In taking enforcement action against foreign ships, a coastal State has to take account of
applicable rights of navigation. While ships of all nations enjoy under Articles 17 and 52(1)
LOSC a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea and archipelagic waters, they
lose this right if they engage in unauthorized fishing.141 This loss gives the coastal State in
                                               
136 Although third States would pursuant to Art. 62(2) LOSC in principle have access to a surplus of the TAC in
the EEZ, the relevant factors which the coastal State is obliged to take into account under para. (3) of the
same provision, would easily enable it to deny access altogether. See also Art. 297(3)(b).
137 As Section 6.2 indicates, for example, Australia, Canada and the United States deny access to foreign
flagged vessels altogether. On the other hand, New Zealand and South Africa impose the requirement to
install ALCs on all (licensed) foreign vessels, while only certain national vessels are covered.
138 State practice confirms this (see the conclusions in Section 6.4).
139 Argos has offered the latter option to the FFA Member States.
140 A good example is that of several fishing vessels from the R.O.C. (Taiwan) that faced steep penalties for
violations committed in the maritime zones of the United States. They therefore decided to accept the
United States offer for lower penalties if they would have ALCs installed and switched on anywhere and at
all times (information kindly obtained from Mr. P. Ortiz (NOAA).
141 Worth noting is that the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (TSC; Geneva, 29
April 1958. In force 10 September 1964, 526 United Nations Treaty Series 205) provides in Art. 14(5):
“Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered innocent if they do not observe such laws and
regulations as the coastal State may make and publish in order to prevent these vessels from fishing in the
territorial sea.” In the view of two commentators, “Such laws could deal not only with actual fishing but also
with, for example, storage of nets while the vessel was in transit” (Churchill and Lowe 1999, supra note 63,
at p. 84). During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) a similar
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principle unlimited enforcement powers, subject to relevant principles of international law,
such as necessity and proportionality.142
Even if a fishing vessel is not caught in the act of unauthorized fishing in the territorial
sea or archipelagic waters, the coastal State is allowed to take certain enforcement
measures. Boarding could for instance be undertaken to verify if the ALC is functioning
properly. Unlike Article 73 LOSC in relation to the EEZ, the LOSC does not explicitly refer to
such powers over fishing in the territorial sea or archipelagic waters. However, similar
powers to those in the EEZ would a fortiori be available in these areas as the coastal State
has sovereignty and not ‘merely’ relevant sovereign rights.143 Article 73 provides that:
The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and
manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance
with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
Such powers can therefore in principle be used against fishing vessels exercising the right
of innocent passage in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters or the freedom of
navigation in the EEZ. Also, both licensed and unlicensed foreign vessels can be targeted,
whether or not they are engaged in fishing. Decisive for the lawfulness of the enforcement
action is if the coastal State has taken proper account of the applicable rights and freedoms
of navigation. The LOSC does not provide much guidance on that issue. All it in fact says is
that innocent passage should not be unreasonably hampered and that the exercise of
freedom of navigation in the EEZ should not be unnecessarily interfered with.144 Unlike the
respective provisions related to vessel-source pollution,145 no mention is made of a
requirement that enforcement cannot be undertaken unless certain evidence exists that a
violation has taken place.146 Ultimately, however, if coastal States fail to meet these tests,
they run the risk of being held liable for damage caused. With respect to foreign fishing
vessels authorized to fish, special provisions on enforcement could of course be included in
their licenses, thereby avoiding liability (in certain cases) from occurring.147
                                                                                                                                                 
provision was included in proposals for Art. 19, but never made it to the final text (see Nandan and
Rosenne 1993, supra note 104, at pp. 164-183). Thus, although coastal States may prescribe that a vessel
stows its nets while in lateral passage, a violation of such a regulation does not render passage non-
innocent (see, for instance, S. 49(1) 1998 Marine Living Resources Act of South Africa (see Section 6.2)).
The newly agreed situation under the LOSC also implies that the non-stowage of fishing nets cannot be
interpreted as a “fishing activity” within the meaning of Art. 19(2)(i). However, as will become clear from the
ensuing discussion, this does not prevent coastal States from taking appropriate enforcement measures.
142 Art. 25(1) LOSC allows the coastal State to “take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent
passage which is not innocent.” While ‘no force strategies’ are often promoted, this does not prejudice a
State’s right to take measures that involve the use of force. See also the observations by the ITLOS on the
use of force in the Saiga (Merits) Case, which basically reaffirm the substance of Art. 22(1)(f) 1995 Fish
Stocks Agreement (Judgement, para. 156). See also the Chinese statement upon signature of the 1995
Fish Stocks Agreement (http://www.un.org/Depts/los).
143 Art. 2(1) LOSC. See also Arts. 21(1)(e) and 27 (note in particular paras. (1)(a) and (5)).
144 Arts. 24(1), 56(2) and 58(1) LOSC. The term ‘unreasonably’ is used to differentiate because all enforcement
hampers in fact innocent passage (see Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at p. 245; note that Art. 232 LOSC
uses the qualification ‘reasonably’ in relation to the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution).
The qualification ‘unnecessarily’ is drawn from Art. 73(1). The words “should not” in Art. 27(1) are widely
regarded as denoting something less than a full obligation under international law, being dependent on the
comity and good will of the coastal State.
145 See, for example, Art. 220(2) LOSC.
146 However, Nandan and Rosenne 1993, supra note 104, at p. 565 submit that fishing vessels with their gear
stowed can only be subjected to visual inspection to check that they are not engaged in fishing. Note that
Art. 21(1) 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement does not require ‘clear grounds’ before boarding and inspection but
in para. (5) only if further enforcement steps are being taken. But see safeguards in para. (10). However,
para. (14) requires ‘clear grounds’ in a different situation. The similarity presents itself with the practice of
the ‘initial control’ under regional memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on port State control, for example
the Paris MOU (Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Paris, 26 January 1982. In effect 1
July 1982, http://www.parismou.org; see S. 3.6.2).
147 See Art. 62(4)(k) LOSC. Again, coastal States should take account of the general limits to prescription
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Coastal State enforcement powers in areas subject to the regimes of transit and ASLs
passage are not treated very straightforward in the LOSC. With respect to fishing vessels
engaged in unauthorized fishing it has already been argued that they cannot claim to be in
‘normal mode’.148 Consequently, unauthorized fishing is classified as what Article 38(3)
defines “an activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit [or ASLs] passage” and
becomes subject to “the other applicable provisions” of the LOSC.149 Arguably, such vessels
should be treated on the same footing as vessels in non-innocent passage.
By applying for licenses to fish in areas subject to transit or ASLs passage, foreign
fishing vessels would seem to consent in advance to be subject to the same enforcement
powers as they would be in an area subject to innocent passage. A more difficult question is
whether foreign fishing vessels without licenses which are not engaged in fishing can be
subjected to enforcement action. Neither Part III nor Part IV contains a provision which
explicitly recognizes strait and archipelagic State enforcement powers, other than Article
38(3). Article 44 (and Article 54 by cross-reference) explicitly stipulates that transit and ASLs
passage shall not be hampered or suspended. Prima facie, the prescriptive powers “with
respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing, including the stowage of fishing gear”
under Article 42(1)(c) would presume the existence of enforcement powers. However, this
would mean that subparagraphs (a) and (b) in relation to the safety of navigation and
vessel-source pollution could be approached in a similar fashion. Quite contrary to such an
interpretation, Article 233 has been explicitly incorporated to grant strait States limited
enforcement powers. As a provision linked to Article 42(1)(c) has not been included in the
LOSC, no related enforcement powers can be presumed. Ignoring this conclusion would
lead to the erosion of the special character of the regimes of transit and ASLs passage.
Another enforcement option is included in Article 111 LOSC, which gives coastal States
the right of hot pursuit when a foreign ship has violated their laws and regulations. Finally, in
addition to enforcement at sea in relation to violations committed in their maritime zones,
coastal States may of course also take the less onerous decision to take enforcement
measures while the foreign fishing vessel has voluntarily called at one of their ports or
anchorages.
4.4 Port State Approaches
As ports lie commonly wholly within a State’s territory150 and fall on that account under its
territorial sovereignty, general international law acknowledges in principle full coastal (port)
State jurisdiction within ports. This allows a port State not only to deny foreign (fishing)
vessels in principle access to port but also to prescribe non-discriminatory laws and
regulations that determine conditions for the entry into its ports.151 While it could be argued
that State practice indicates that ports are commonly open, this does not imply the existence
of a legal right of access to ports under general international law. Access cannot, however,
be denied under all circumstances. While ships in distress should in most cases be given
                                                                                                                                                 
discussed in Section 4.3.1.4.
148 See text accompanying note 85.
149 Part IV on Archipelagic States does not explicitly contain a similar provision but for several reasons it
should be presumed to apply (cf. Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at pp. 341-342).
150 See Arts. 11, 12 and 121(1) LOSC.
151 Cf. A.V. Lowe, The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 14 San Diego Law Review
597-622 (1977), p. 608. G. Plant, Navigation Regime in the Turkish Straits for Merchant Ships in
Peacetime, 20 Marine Policy 15-27 (1996), at p. 17 speaks in this context of jurisdiction based on the
‘destination principle’. Australia has used its right to refuse entry in its ports to Japanese vessels as a
retaliatory measure against the failure to reach agreement in the context of the Southern Bluefin Tuna
fishery (see Separate Opinion by Judges Yamamoto and Park in the Southern Bluefin Tuna (Provisional
Measures) Cases (supra note 23).
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access to ports, there are circumstances in which the port (or coastal) State’s interests
override those of the ship.152
Article 25(2) LOSC confirms the customary port State right to prescribe conditions for
admission into ports and to take the necessary steps to prevent the breach of these
conditions.153 Nevertheless, limitations on port State jurisdiction may arise from bilateral or
multilateral treaties relevant to access to ports, if it concerns matters essentially internal to a
vessel, or from general international law.
4.4.1 Prescription
The issue which needs to be addressed here is the extent of port State powers to prescribe
conditions for the entry into port in the form of CDEM standards, viz. ALCs. This would be
relevant for foreign fishing vessels not authorized to fish in that State’s maritime zones, but
that nevertheless want to call in one of its ports, for instance for the purpose of landing
catch.154 A crucial consideration is that the obligation incorporated in Article 21(2) LOSC not
to prescribe CDEM standards other than those that have become generally accepted,
applies only to ships in lateral passage. This does therefore not constitute a departure from
general international law and Article 25(2) LOSC.155
                                               
152 See Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at p. 101, n. 125 who discusses so-called ‘leper ships’.
153 See also Art. 211(3) LOSC, which essentially reaffirms Art. 25(2) in the area of the prevention, reduction
and control of vessel-source marine pollution.
154 Under S. 102 1991 Fisheries Management Act of Australia (see Section 6.2), foreign fishing vessels not
authorized to fish in the Australian EEZ need a permit to enter into an Australian port. Obtaining a port
permit can, under S. 94(5), be made subject to certain conditions. These powers were used to require
certain fishing vessels registered in New Zealand to have ALCs on board and switched on as a condition for
entry into port (information obtained from M. Sachse and J. Harford, AFMA). In the framework of CCAMLR,
Australia also proposed to require non-Contracting Party vessels to install ALCs as a condition for landing
or transshipping catch in port (CCAMLR-XVII, paras. 5.65-5.69 and Annex 5, paras. 2.68-2.70; see also the
strong objections by Chile in para. 5.69; text of Report and Conservation Measures available at
http://www.ccamlr.org). CCAMLR Conservation Measure 118/XVII entitled ‘Scheme to Promote Compliance
by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures’ was ultimately amended to read
in para. (5) that:
“Landing and transhipments of all fish from a non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been inspected
pursuant to paragraph 4, shall be prohibited in all Contracting Party ports if such inspection reveals that
the vessel has on board species subject to CCAMLR Conservation Measures, unless the vessel
establishes that the fish were caught outside the Convention Area or in compliance with all relevant
CCAMLR Conservation Measures and requirements under the Convention.”
The evidence produced by the vessel could include information from a VMS (see para. (4) of Cons. Meas.
118/XVII). For example, South Africa requires that fishing vessels with certain species on board (including
Patagonian Toothfish and Orange Roughy) are in possession of or apply for a permit upon entry into one of
South Africa’s ports. A condition of such a permit is that the authorities need to be satisfied that the fish
concerned have not been illegally taken in the maritime zones of South Africa or another State. Sufficient is
a declaration of catch by another coastal State or the fact that the vessel uses an ALC or an observer under
South African control. Otherwise South Africa reserves the right to refuse the vessel future entry except for
force majeure (Annex 12 of Regulation R. 1111 of 2 September 1998 (under the Marine Living Resources
Act 1998 (see Section 6.2); information kindly obtained from Mr. D. Miller). See also the South African
statements in CCAMLR-XVII, para. 5.11 which reveal a strong commitment to exercise port State
jurisdiction.
155 However, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the Sellers v. Maritime Safety Inspector (Sellers) Case (Case
No. CA104/98, Judgment of 5 November 1998) concludes that “a port state has no general power to
unilaterally impose its own requirements on foreign ships relating to their construction, their safety and
other equipment and their crewing if the requirements are to have an effect on the high seas. Any
requirements cannot go beyond those generally accepted, especially in the maritime conventions and
regulations” (at p. 17; see also J.S. Davidson, Freedom of Navigation on the High Seas: Sellers v. Maritime
Safety Inspector, 14 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 435-439 (1999)). Cf. D.H. Anderson,
Port States and Environmental Protection, in Boyle and Freestone 1999, supra note 110, pp. 325-344, who
argues, inter alia, on p. 344 that “[t]he prescription of standards must remain an international task”. In his
view, the policy of restraint exercised by States generally, including through arrangements such as the
Paris MOU (supra note 146), makes unilateral approaches increasingly harder to justify.
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As was already observed in Section 4.3.1.4, requiring compliance with a CDEM
standard has extra-territorial effects. These extra-territorial effects should in principle be
regarded as incidental rather than the very object of these conditions, unless of course the
opposite is proven.156 This is not to say that international law imposes no restraints on the
port State.157 One such restraint is couched in the obligation that the exercise of jurisdiction,
rights or freedoms shall not constitute an abuse of rights.158 The following observations by
Lauterpacht help to clarify the meaning of this principle:
As legal rights are conferred by the community, the latter cannot countenance their anti-social use
by individuals; that the exercise of a hitherto legal right becomes unlawful when it degenerates
into an abuse of rights; and that there is such an abuse of rights each time the general interest of
the community is injuriously affected as the result of the sacrifice of an important social or
individual interest to a less important, though hitherto legally recognized, individual right.159
In acknowledging that every right has its limitations, the notion of abuse of rights involves in
many instances the balancing of conflicting rights. This approach was, inter alia, pursued in
the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration.160 Here the Permanent Court of Arbitration observed
with regard to the right of Great Britain to legislate for the protection and preservation of
fisheries that:
Regulations which are (1) appropriate or necessary for the protection and preservation of such
fisheries, or (2) desirable or necessary on grounds of public order and morals without
unnecessarily interfering with the fishery itself, and in both cases equitable and fair as between
local and American fishermen, and not so framed as to give unfairly an advantage to the former
over the latter class, are not inconsistent with the obligation to execute the treaty in good faith and
are therefore reasonable and not in violation of the treaty.161
Applying these considerations to the requirement to install ALCs as a condition for entry into
port, involves difficult assessments of elements such as appropriateness, necessity, or
desirability. Arguably, the element of national treatment would be less problematic, as it is
not fully applicable in relation to fisheries management in areas under national jurisdiction.162
Nevertheless, if this requirement is exclusively imposed for the purpose of fisheries
management, this would arguably indicate a presumption of good faith and would make it
harder to prove an abuse of rights.
But even if it would be permitted to formulate the fitting of ALCs as a condition of entry
into port, this would be useless if not linked to an obligation to have it also switched on to
allow the transmission of information. This complementary obligation cannot convincingly be
regarded as a CDEM standard itself or as being part and parcel of it. Conversely, it should
be regarded as independent behavior. As the analysis in Section 4.3.1.4 already revealed,
general international law is extremely reluctant in accepting jurisdiction over prior behaviour.
                                               
156 See The International Association of Independent Tanker Owners v. Lowry (or Locke), et al. (Intertanko)
Case (United States District Court, Western District of Washington at Seattle, Case No. C95-1096C, Order
of 8 November 1996, 947 F. Supp. 1484), at p. 32.
157 However, E.J. Molenaar, Residual Jurisdiction under IMO Regulatory Conventions, in: ‘Competing Norms in
the Law of Marine Environmental Protection’, H. Ringbom (ed.), London/The Hague/Boston, Kluwer Law
International, 1997, pp. 201-216, even considers that the fact that a State is Party to IMO Conventions,
does not necessarily restrict its exercise of port State jurisdiction.
158 See Art. 300 LOSC.
159 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933, p.
286.
160 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (Great Britain v. the United States of America), Permanent Court
of Arbitration, 1910, J.B. Scott, The Hague Court Reports, Vol. 1, p. 141.
161 Ibid., p. 171.
162 See Section 4.3.1.4. Conversely, the citation from the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration deals not with
general international law but with bilateral treaty-relations.
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From a port State perspective, the requirement to have the ALC switched on in its (coastal
State’s) maritime zones would be essentially similar to regulating behaviour that occurs
beyond its maritime zones. This conclusion is inevitable when it is assumed, as Section
4.3.1.2 does, that foreign vessels without licenses cannot be required to install ALCs and
have them switched on while they navigate through a coastal State’s maritime zones.
Although ships subject themselves to port State jurisdiction by their voluntary presence
in port, such jurisdiction cannot extend to prior behavior unless international law recognizes
the existence of a sufficiently close or substantial connection with the port State. Although
this issue could be pursued from the perspective of prescription, the relevant international
instruments treat it commonly in the sphere of enforcement. Discussion is therefore deferred
to the next Section.
4.4.2 Enforcement
Port State enforcement is always in-port enforcement. It is based on the vessel’s voluntary
presence in port and can only extend to issues for which international law authorizes the
port State to prescribe.163 While enforcement to verify compliance with lawfully prescribed
CDEM standards is not controversial, quite the opposite is true with respect to behaviour
that occurred before a vessel enters the maritime zones of the coastal State. Nevertheless,
international law provides some possibilities to exercise enforcement over prior behaviour,
for example with respect to illegal discharges.164
The global instruments on fisheries that were adopted in the 1990s all address port
State enforcement. Article V(2) 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement contains an obligation for
port States to notify the flag State if it has “reasonable grounds for believing” that a fishing
vessel voluntarily in their port “has been used for an activity that undermines the
effectiveness of international conservation and management measures”.165 No mention is
made of the power to conduct inspections. However, as this would be necessary to obtain
“reasonable grounds for believing”, this power is to be inferred (see further infra). It is
important to note that the obligation is limited to notifying the flag State and does not extend
to the inspection,166 and is in any case only applicable between States Parties to the 1993
FAO Compliance Agreement.
Section 8.3 1995 FAO Code of Conduct does not give the port State more powers in
comparison with the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, nor does it impose more (stringent)
obligations. Undoubtedly due to its voluntary nature, it calls upon port States to take
measures but emphasizes that these should be “in accordance with international law,
including applicable international agreements or arrangements”, or upon the request of the
flag State.
The 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, which is of course in principle only concerned with
straddling and highly migratory stocks, deals with port State enforcement in Article 23, which
provides:
                                               
163 A case of non-voluntary presence exists where a vessel has violated coastal State enactments while in its
maritime zones and has subsequently been directed to one of that coastal State’s ports. This is therefore
more properly dealt with under coastal State enforcement.
164 Art. 218 LOSC. See the reference to Art. 218 and the efforts by regional MOUs on port State control in S.
8.3.2 1995 FAO Code of Conduct. Also noteworthy is that the way in which the United States regulates
anchoring in certain parts of its EEZ (supra note 127) was preferred above formulating it as a condition for
the entry into port (cf. W.T. Burke, Changes Made in the Rules of Navigation and Maritime Trade by the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, in: The Developing Order of the Oceans, Proceedings of the Law
of the Sea Institute 18th Annual Conference, R.B. Krueger and S.A. Riesenfeld (eds.), San Francisco, 1984
(Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1985), pp. 662-677, at p. 669).
165 Although this provision does not explicitly mention that these measures are intended to apply to high seas
fishing, this can be inferred from the full title of the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and from the scope of
application in Art. II(1). However, the definition of ‘international conservation and management measures’ in
Art. I(b) does not refer to the high seas.
166 This is different for regional MOUs on port State control, which contain specified inspection targets.
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 1. A port State has the right and the duty to take measures, in accordance with international law,
to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and global conservation and management
measures. When taking such measures a port State shall not discriminate in form or in fact
against the vessels of any State.
 2. A port State may, inter alia, inspect documents, fishing gear and catch on board fishing
vessels, when such vessels are voluntarily in its ports or at its offshore terminals.
 3. States may adopt regulations empowering the relevant national authorities to prohibit landings
and transshipments where it has been established that the catch has been taken in a manner
which undermines the effectiveness of subregional, regional or global conservation and
management measures on the high seas.
 4. Nothing in this article affects the exercise by States of their sovereignty over ports in their
territory in accordance with international law.
First of all, the fact that port States have both a “right and a duty” to take the measures
referred to, is innovatory due to its inclusion in a legally binding instrument. However, if
paragraph (2) is to be regarded as innovatory is more difficult to answer. To some extent,
this is due to the uncertain meaning of the words “inter alia”. Leaving that aside, it seems
that, based on its territorial sovereignty, a port State would surely have the right to inspect
vessels that wish to call on its ports. Uncertain is if this would also allow the port State to
carry out an inspection to verify what happened beyond its maritime zones. The absence of
any reference to inspection in Article V(2) 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement (discussed
supra) suggests this should be answered positively. Moreover, in practice it may be quite
difficult to make such a distinction in the inspection phase. It is admitted, however, that the
opposite could be argued as well: the fact that the port State would not, in the absence of an
explicit basis, be permitted to impose penalties if the inspection reveals illegal behavior,
presumably implies that general international law would simply not allow such an inspection.
In case the inspection reveals that “the catch has been taken in a manner which
undermines the effectiveness of subregional, regional or global conservation and
management measures on the high seas”, paragraph (3) explicitly authorizes the port State
to prohibit landings and transshipments. No mention is made of the power to detain or to
institute proceedings.167 Again, it could be argued that a port State’s right to deny entry into
port under general international law would include such less intrusive measures as the
prohibition of landings and transshipments. However, contrary to such an opinion, it seems
that none of these powers could be used in relation to issues for which the port State has no
authority to prescribe (under general international law). On the basis of the above, the
conclusion would be that the exercise of the general right to prescribe conditions for the
entry into port amounts to an abuse of rights if it relates to prior behaviour for which the port
State has no explicit legal basis to prescribe.
In spite of the view taken here, due to the high complexity of the issue it is more than
likely that varying views on the matter can be expected to persist.168 A clear indication of the
                                               
167 M. Hayashi, The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Law of the Sea, in: ‘Order for the Oceans at the
Turn of the Century’, D. Vidas and W. Østreng (eds.), The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International,
1999, pp. 37-53, at p. 46 mentions that the power to detain did not make it through the negotiation phase.
See in this respect the Uruguaian declaration upon signature of the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (No. 5).
Note that Art. 218 LOSC explicitly allows the institution of proceedings and implicitly the power to detain (cf.
Molenaar 1998, supra note 43, at p. 462). Moreover, S. 4.3, para. 49 Technical Guidelines No. 1 (Fishing
Operations) to the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct, seems to allow detention for violations of “international
agreements for the conservation and management of living marine resources and protection of the
environment” (para. 48(e)(ii)). This could be careless drafting as much of the substance of these paras. is
concerned with safety requirements (CDEM standards).
168 See the practice by Australia and South Africa in note 154. See also Anderson 1999, supra note 155, at pp.
338-341 for a discussion of the conflicting views during the negotiations on the 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement. Edeson 1999, supra note 110, at p. 179 submits that the provisions in the global instruments
discussed in the main text “do not have any significant difference in potential application in view of the fact
that port States already can do what they want in respect of vessels in their ports (voluntarily or otherwise),
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contentious nature of port State enforcement, and implicitly prescription, is paragraph (4) of
Article 23 which contains a non-prejudicial clause. Several regional fisheries management
mechanisms have adopted the approach taken in Article 23 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,
but also apply it towards vessels flying the flag of a Non-Contracting State without taking
account of that State’s adherence to the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.169 Moreover, the
practice of several States seems to go well beyond even that.170
5 Satellite Remote Sensing (SRS) and Space Law
Outer space is similar to the high seas in the sense that neither of them can be subjected to
the sovereignty of States and are thus res communis.171 As will be clarified, this
categorization influences the rights and obligations of States towards satellite remote
sensing (SRS) considerably. The principal international instrument which governs the rights
and obligations of States engaging in activities in outer space is the Space Treaty.172 The
main points of relevance for the purpose of this article are laid down in Articles I and III.
Article I recognizes that “[o]uter space (...) shall be free for exploration and use by all States
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international
law” and that “[t]here shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space”.
These two freedoms (the freedom of exploration and use, and the freedom of scientific
investigation) are subject to Article III, under which States Parties to the Space Treaty “shall
carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space (...) in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and
understanding.” In other words, these freedoms can only be exercised for ‘peaceful
purposes’.173 Articles IV and IX further reinforce the overarching objective of the peaceful
use of outer space. The issue of ownership, jurisdiction and control is governed by Article
                                                                                                                                                 
subject only to certain very general limitations imposed by international law or specific limitations derived
from treaties”. Cf. P. Örebech, K. Sigurjonsson and T.L. McDorman, The 1995 United Nations Straddling
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement, 13
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 119-141 (1998), at p. 132. However, M. Hayashi, The 1995
Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the Law of the Sea
Convention, 29 Ocean & Coastal Management 51-69 (1995), at p. 63, treats Art. 23 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement as an innovation modeled on Art. 218 LOSC. Cf. Anderson 1999, supra note 155. R. Barston,
United Nations Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 19 Marine Policy 159-166
(1995), at p. 166 who regards Art. 23 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement as a “misapplication of the port state
concept”, would probably also consider it to be innovatory.
169 For example, CCAMLR Conservation Measure 118/XVII (supra note 154), in particular paras. (4) and (5),
NAFO’s ‘Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with the Conservation and
Enforcement Measures established by NAFO’ (NAFO/GC Doc. 97/6, http://www.nafo.ca; in particular paras.
(9) and (10)), and Art. 14 Draft SEAFO (South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization) Convention (5th
Meeting). A proposal by the United States at the 4th Meeting to revise Art. 14 would have even allowed the
port State to “detain the vessels for such reasonable period of time as necessary for enforcement
purposes” (para. (3); see para. (6) for mutatis mutandis application to fishing vessels of non-Parties).
170 The United States Lacey Act (Public Law 97-79, effective 16 November 1981, 16 United States Code §§
3371-3378, in particular § 3372) permits the (in-port) inspection of foreign vessels to verify if fishing has
taken place in contravention of other States’ enactments, and the imposition of fines and confiscation of the
catch if a violation has been ascertained (see Lodge 1997, supra note 51, at p. 163). S. 75(2) 1998
Fisheries Management Act of Papua New Guinea appears to take a similar approach. Anderson 1999,
supra note 155, at pp. 338 and 341 discusses legislation of Iceland and Norway which permits denial of
entry in case of undermining of internationally agreed conservation measures committed beyond their
maritime zones.
171 See Art. 89 LOSC and Art. II Space Treaty (infra note 172).
172 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, New York, 19 December 1966. In force 10 October 1967, 61
American Journal of International Law, 644 (1967).
173 See also Art. IV which deals with military activities, and Art. 88 LOSC which stipulates that “The high seas
shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.”
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VIII, which basically says that the State who launches an object into outer space shall retain
ownership, jurisdiction and control over such object.
Worth observing here is that the Space Treaty does not define the limit between outer
space and air space. This is not insignificant as aircraft (or other objects) do not have a right
of overflight in the air space above areas which fall under State sovereignty, viz. landward of
the outer limit of the territorial sea.174 A suggestion for a sensible limit would be the lowest
technically desirable altitude above the earth sufficient to permit free orbit of spacecraft,
therefore around 100 (regular) miles.175
There can be little doubt that SRS involves the ‘use of space’ in the sense of Article III,
even though it is strongly earth-oriented.176 Apart from the Space Treaty, however, there is
to this date no legally binding international instrument specifically relating to SRS. All there
is are the Principles on Remote Sensing (SRS Principles), adopted in 1986 by the United
Nations General Assembly.177 These govern SRS undertaken for the limited number of
purposes listed in Principle I, one of which is “improving natural resources management”.
SRS for the purpose of monitoring compliance with fishery regulations will not quickly
raise the issue of third States. A costly undertaking such as this is likely to be limited to the
maritime zones of the State(s) paying for it. Even if the satellite would be in orbit above and
therefore able to ‘sense’ the maritime zones of a State not formally participating, the costs
would often be prohibitive. This would be quite different if, for instance, SRS would be used
to locate fish stocks. For this purpose, the rights of non-participating States are briefly
addressed.
Principle IV of the SRS Principles establishes the general rule that SRS shall not be
“detrimental” to the sensed States. In addition, some special situations are covered by
Principles X and XI, which stipulate that if States participating in remote sensing activities
have information relating to natural disasters or other phenomena harmful to the Earth’s
natural environment, they “shall” disclose or transmit such information to States concerned.
Of special relevance is the situation where SRS relates to areas under the jurisdiction of
non-participating States. Although some States were in favor of a right to require prior
consent, Principle XIII takes a prior consultation approach pursuant to which:
a State carrying out remote sensing of the earth from space shall, upon request, enter into
consultation with a State whose territory is sensed in order to make available opportunities for
participation and enhance the mutual benefits to be derived therefrom.
This obligation relates only to the “territory” of the other State and excludes therefore
maritime zones seaward of the territorial sea. It may be clear from the wording that the
sensed State is not in a particularly strong negotiating position. This contrasts sharply with
the regime of marine scientific research (MSR) in Part XIII of the LOSC, which recognizes
practically exclusive coastal State controls for such research carried out in its maritime
zones.178 Once SRS has been engaged in, with or without the involvement of the ‘sensed
                                               
174 See Arts. 2(2), 19, 86 and 87 LOSC. Art. 2(2) provides that a State’s sovereignty extends to the air space
over its territory (which includes the territorial sea). Arts. 38(2) and 53(3) LOSC contain exceptions by
granting a right of overflight over areas subject to transit and ASLs passage.
175 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 4th ed., 1990, p. 268.
176 Cf. I.H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Space Law, Deventer/Boston, Kluwer Law and Taxation
Publishers, 1993, p. 65.
177 Adopted by Resolution 41/65 on 11 December 1986, UN. Doc. A/Res/41/65 (1987) (unanimously adopted).
178 P. Birnie, Law of the Sea and Ocean Resources: Implications for Marine Scientific Research, 10
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 229-251 (1995), at p. 247 observes that Part XIII does not
specifically cover or restrict MSR carried out by SRS. At any rate, SRS used for the purpose of monitoring
of vessels cannot be categorized under MSR because, in view of Soons’ definition of MSR (supra note 34),
not the marine environment but the vessels are the object. Churchill and Lowe 1999, supra note 63, at p.
412 observe that the LOSC provisions on MSR may to some extent become obsolete due to the expected
increase in remote sensing.
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State’, Principle XII provides that with respect to information179 relating to a State’s territory,
the ‘sensed State’ “shall have access (...) on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable
cost terms”. In conclusion, therefore, international law does not substantially restrain States
wishing to engage in SRS.
6 Satellite-based VMSs and State Practice
6.1 Introduction
This Section discusses the developments in State practice on the use of satellite-based
VMSs for fisheries management. A number of comments to clarify the scope of the
discussion are called for. A significant one is that no account is taken of the often wide-
spread use by private companies that seek to improve management,180 or of States that are
still in a process of implementing a satellite-based VMS at the time of writing.181
Section 6.3 deals with six regional fisheries management mechanisms (RFMMs)182 that
have taken steps towards using satellite-based VMSs to manage fisheries in their regulatory
areas, viz. CCAMLR, FFA, ICCAT, NAFO, NEAFC and the RFMM in the Central Bering
Sea.183 Moreover, negotiations are currently under way to establish two new RFMMs; one in
the South East Atlantic and another in the Central and Western Pacific. Both negotiation-
processes have already agreed that some kind of VMS will be used by the future RFMM.184
As will become clear, their operational status varies considerably. There may be a variety of
reasons to which this can be attributed, for example the type of fish stocks. Also highly
relevant is the type of cooperation which in its turn depends on factors such as the spatial
scope and jurisdictional fragmentation of the regulatory area and the number and type of
States participating.
Evidently, the distinction between the practice of States on the one hand, and
developments in RFMMs on the other hand, raises red flags. At least part of State practice
must logically be aimed at implementing the regulatory decisions taken at the regional level.
The emphasis in Section 6.2 will therefore be primarily focussed on additional or
complementary initiatives, either on a flag State basis, on a coastal State basis, or on
both.185 The figures of vessels covered are thought to be correct at the moment of writing
(January 2000). While comprehensiveness would certainly have been preferable, certain
                                               
179 The terms ‘primary data’, ‘processed data’ and ‘analyzed information’ are defined in Principle I. In essence,
they indicate stages in which raw data is transferred into usable information.
180 SOFIA 1998, supra note 29, at Box 16 speaks of “an exponential increase” in recent years.
181 Madagascar is currently considering a satellite-based VMS for shrimp fisheries management (information
kindly obtained from Mr. X. Vincent, Oceanic Développement, May 1999). The Seychelles hope to have a
satellite-based VMS in operation in 2000. The intention is to develop the system gradually while initially only
purse seiners will be targeted (information kindly provided by Mr. P. Michaud, Seychelles Fishing Authority,
January 2000).
182 RFMM is meant to be an overarching term inspired by the distinction between organizations and
‘arrangements’ in the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (e.g. Arts. 8(1) and 9(1)).
183 Compared to the others, the FFA has very different characteristics, which have an impact on its qualification
as ‘arrangement’ and ‘regulatory area’. For the purpose of this article, however, the FFA is lumped together
with the other RFMMs. Practice of FFA Member States is therefore discussed in the context of the
regulatory developments undertaken by the FFA. An exception is made for Australia and New Zealand
which had already developed a VMS before the FFA undertook action. With respect to fisheries
management, the EC is regarded as one State rather than a RFMM (cf. Churchill 1987, supra note 2, at p.
177). For the purpose of this article at least, the 1998 STR Arrangement between Australia and New
Zealand is not regarded as a RFMM (infra Section 6.2, under Australia). Finally, a Meeting of the Latin
American Organization for the Development of Fisheries (OLDEPESCA) in November 1999, adopted a
declaration in which it recognizes the value of satellite-based VMSs for sustainable fisheries management.
184 See Art. Art. 15(3)(a) SEAFO (South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization) Draft Convention (5th Meeting,
October 1999) and Art. 24(8) CWPFO (Central and Western Pacific Fisheries Organization) Draft
Convention (5th Session, September 1999).
185 State practice on port State approaches is referred to in the footnotes in Section 4.4. References to these
footnotes have also been made in Section 6.2, for States individually.
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information could due to the global approach not be collected or may have been missed.186
Finally, as the aim is to give readers a general overview, the regulatory initiatives are not
discussed in detail. Elements such as ALC-related conditions, penalties, contingency plans
in case ALCs do not function and the many other elements referred to in Section 3.3 are
included in most, if not all, regulatory instruments.
6.2 States
Argentina
Disposicion No. 1 of 10 January 1997 of the register of the Under-Secretary of Fisheries,
requires certain Argentine ships to install an ALC (referred to as ‘MONPESAT’) on board.
Resolution No. 367, of 28 December 1998, by the Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock,
Fisheries and Food lays down a number of obligations which these ships have to comply
with, inter alia that the ALC is to be switched on at all times, except when the ship is in port.
Foreign ships authorized to fish in Argentina’s maritime zones are also required to have
ALCs installed and switched on.187
Australia188
Jurisdiction over fisheries in Australia’s maritime zones is shared between, on the one hand,
the states and territories and, on the other hand, the federal government. On the issue of
VMS, both levels use Inmarsat-C and assess for each individual fishery whether VMS is a
necessary regulatory tool or not. At the federal level, the requirement to install an ALC is
included in the permit conditions of around 280 vessels.189 While all foreign vessels would
also be required to comply with these conditions, at the moment of writing no foreign
vessels are authorized to fish in Australia’s maritime zones.190
At the state and territories level, Queensland is currently tracking around 650 vessels,
which could increase with another 750.191 Tasmania tracks momentarily around 80 vessels
but another 320 could potentially be covered.192 Western Australia covers 45 vessels, with a
                                               
186 For example, no information could be obtained from Chile, China, Morocco (noted in the FAO VMS
Guidelines, supra note 10, at p. 3), the Russian Federation, South Korea and Uruguay (see CCAMLR-XVIII,
para. 2.15).
187 Foreign ships authorized to fish fall under a charter-regime. Information kindly provided by Mr. F. Lopez,
MONitoreo de PESca SATelital (MONPESAT), INIDEP, Argentina, May/June 1999.
188 See also the references to Australia in notes 21, 93, 120, 151 and 154.
189 The main fisheries are: South East Trawl Fishery, the North West Slope/Western Deepwater Fishery, the
Bass Strait Central Zone Scallop Fishery and the Northern Prawn Fishery. The authority to impose such a
requirement is based on S. 32 1991 Fisheries Management Act (Act No. 162, of 10 November 1991, text
available at: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act). Australia’s ratification of the 1995 Fish
Stocks Agreement was accompanied by the Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1999 (No. 143,
1999), which allows for the issuing of permits for fishing on the high seas in a similar fashion as within those
fisheries within Australia’s maritime zones that are regulated at the federal level.
190 Information kindly provided by Mr. P. Callagher, AFMA, May/June 1999.
191 While the authority to impose ALCs is based on the Fisheries Act 1994 (see also S. 184(5 and 6) on
evidentiary provisions), specific management plans contain relevant provisions. For example, the Fisheries
(East Coast Trawl) Management Plan 1999 (Ss. 10, 57-65 and 171; S. 10 contains the so-called ‘exclusion
zone’) and the Fisheries (Gulf Of Carpentaria Inshore Fin Fish) Management Plan 1999 (Ss. 68-69 and 94).
Legislation available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/OQPChome.htm.
192 While the authority to impose ALCs is based on the Living Marine Resources Management Act 1995, the
following statutory rules contain relevant provisions: Fisheries Rules 1996 (Ss. 134A-134C; scallop),
Fisheries (Rock Lobster) Rules 1997 (Ss. 69-71), and Fisheries (Giant Crab) Rules 1999 (Ss. 54(2)(a) and
62). Legislation available at http://www.thelaw.tas.gov.au. Information partly based on N. Fowler and M.
Richardson, Industry Culture and Vessel Monitoring Systems, unpublished paper presented at the 1999
Cairns Conference, supra note 16.
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potential increase of 100.193 Finally, South Australia is currently conducting trials with about
40 vessels and Victoria is also contemplating involvement in VMS.
Since several years, Australia and New Zealand cooperate in the management of an
orange roughy stock in the South Tasman Rise, which is partly within the Australian EEZ
and partly on the high seas.194 The 1998 Arrangement between the Government of Australia
and the Government of New Zealand for the Conservation and Management of Orange
Roughy on the South Tasman Rise (1998 STR Arrangement)195 provides in paragraph 12
that vessels fishing for the stock are to be fitted with ALCs. Although the 1998 STR
Arrangement expired in 1998 and could, despite numerous rounds of negotiation up until the
moment of writing, not yet be renewed, the vessels involved in this fishery are presumably
still subject to the VMS.
Canada196
After an experimental phase, Canada is presently using an Inmarsat VMS for scallop
fisheries within its own maritime zones.197 Applications for licenses to fish for scallops
authorize the use of ALCs in substitution for an on-board observer, provided certain
conditions are met.198 So far only position and identification information is supplied, without
exploring other applications of two-way communication.199 License holders authorize their
service provider to forward the data to the FMC in Halifax. Canada takes the approach of
examining each fishery individually to determine the cost-effectiveness of a satellite-based
VMS. In light of the absence in surplus of TAC, foreign fishing vessels are not likely to
obtain a license for scallop fisheries. In fact, except for a few foreign vessels fishing for hake
and tuna, this is the same for all other fisheries.200
European Community (EC)201
In 1992 the EC decided that EU Member States were to carry out pilot-projects on satellite-
based VMSs, which were to be funded by the EC.202 The positive results from the pilot-
                                               
193 The authority to impose ALCs is based on the Fish Resources Management Act 1994 (see S. 215 on the
accuracy of measuring equipment). Specific provisions are incorporated in the Fish Resources
Management Regulations (No. 8) 1997 (Regs. 55A-55D) and various management plans, e.g. the Pilbara
Fish Trawl and the Northern Demersal Scalefish. For these fisheries, use is made of notifications to
commence and cease fishing (for time-access management) and to transit ‘Closed Waters’. Entry into
Closed Waters without prior notification constitutes an offence. Information kindly provided by R. Casey,
Fisheries Western Australia, December 1999.
194 For Australia, regulatory responsibility lies at the federal level and the particulars of the VMS are therefore
similar to other federal VMS activities. For domestic purposes, Australia uses an Australian Fisheries Zone
(AFZ), which is not always identical to its EEZ.
195 Signed on 12 January 1998 and 18 February 1998 respectively. In effect 1 March 1998, expired 28
February 1999.
196 See also the references to Canada in note 111.
197 Offshore and Inshore Scallop – Scotia-Fundy Sector. Approximately 30 fishing vessels with sizes above 65
ft. are currently covered, but this may be extended considerably.
198 The authority to impose license conditions is based on the regulatory powers under S. 43(e.1) Fisheries Act
(R.S., c. F-14) while S. 22(1) Fishery (General) Regulations (SOR/93-53, P.C. 1993-186, 4 February, 1993)
contains further particulars. All relevant Acts, Orders and Regulations are available at http://www.ncr.dfo.ca.
199 Some preliminary work has been done with video cameras but for various reasons this is not expected to be
implemented in the near future.
200 Information kindly supplied by Ms. M. Glaiber, Enforcement Co-ordination, Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (DFO), Canada, May 1999.
201 See also the references to the EC in notes 58 and 119.
202 Cf. J. Verborgh, VMS Developments in the European Union, unpublished paper presented at the 1999
Cairns Conference, supra note 16, at p. 2. Currently there are 15 EU Member States: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Austria and Luxemburg are land-locked and have not taken any relevant
action (cf. Verborgh 1999, this note, at p. 2). France will establish a VMS in summer 2000 in relation to its
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projects, which took place in 1994/1995, led to the adoption of Council Regulation No
686/97, of 14 April 1997203 which amended the principal regulation for the control of the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP): Council Regulation No 2847/93, of 12 October 1993,
establishing a control system applicable to the common fisheries policy.204 Further relevant
amendments were introduced by Council Regulation No 2846/98, of 17 December 1998.205
Also of paramount significance is Commission Regulation No 1489/97, of 29 July 1997,206
laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation No 2847/93 as regards
satellite-based vessel monitoring systems. Finally, tampering with ALCs is covered by
Council Regulation No 1447/1999 of 24 June 1999 establishing a list of types of behaviour
which seriously infringe the rules of the common fisheries policy.207
As EU Member States have delegated exclusive prescriptive competence in fisheries to
the EC level,208 it is in principle not necessary to examine relevant regulatory activity for
each individual Member State. Also, EC Regulations do not have to be transferred into
national enactments, but in light of the Member States’ competence in enforcement, national
laws and regulations will often be in place. It has not been possible to investigate these
here. Finally, it is also up to each Member State to decide which satellite-system and ALC it
uses.
The EC Regulations mentioned above require all Community vessels (those registered
in or flying the flag of an EU Member State) exceeding 20 metres between perpendiculars or
24 metres overall length, to install ALCs from 1 January 2000.209 From that date, all third-
country fishing vessels of the same dimensions also have to be equipped with ALCs. In the
meantime they are to signal their movements to competent authorities.210 The standard
procedure is that information is transmitted to both the flag State and the coastal State. This
applies to Community waters but often also where Community vessels operate in the
maritime zones of third States. The EC has concluded bilateral agreements on VMS with
Mauritania, Morocco, Norway, the Faroe Islands, the Baltic States, Poland and Russia,
which devote ample attention to these aspects.211
                                                                                                                                                 
overseas territories and the United Kingdom already has VMS in operation for its South Atlantic Ocean
possessions (CCAMLR-XVIII/25, para. 2.15).
203 Official Journal 1997, L 102/1. Consolidated text of EC enactments and treaties at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/index.html).
204 Official Journal 1993, L 261/1. Note that Art. 3 concerns the VMS pilot project.
205 Official Journal 1998, L 358/5.
206 Official Journal 1997, L 202/18.
207 Official Journal 1999, L 167/ 5 (see Annex, under E).
208 See Art. 3(1)(e) EC Treaty (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957.
In force 1 January 1958, 298 United Nations Treaty Series 11. The EC Treaty has, inter alia, been amended
by the 1986 Single European Act, the 1992 EU Treaty and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Art. 3(1)(e) refers
to the consolidated version; see source supra note 203) and the declaration accompanying the EC’s
instrument of formal confirmation of the LOSC, pursuant to Art. 5(1) Annex IX to the LOSC. The caption
“Matters for which the Community has exclusive competence” is immediately followed by the words: “The
Community points out that its Member States have transferred competence to it with regard to the
conservation and management of sea fishing resources. Hence in this field it is for the Community to adopt
the relevant rules and regulations (which are enforced by the Member States) and, within its competence, to
enter into external undertakings with third States or competent international organizations. This competence
applies to waters under national fisheries jurisdiction and to the high seas. Nevertheless, in respect of
measures relating to the exercise of jurisdiction over vessels, flagging and registration of vessels and the
enforcement of penal and administrative sanctions, competence rests with the Member States whilst
respecting Community law. Community law also provides for administrative sanctions”
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los).
209 Some Community vessels were already subject to such a requirement (see Art. 3 Council Reg. No 2847/93
(consolidated text)). However, an exception applies to vessels operating exclusively within 12 nm of the
baselines of Member States and to vessels which operate at sea for less than 24 hours. By June 1999,
about 600 fishing vessels were tracked (Verborgh 1999, supra note 202, at p. 7).
210 See Art. 28c Council Reg. No 2847/93 (consolidated text). See also the definition of ‘third-country fishing
vessels’ in Art. 28a, which, inter alia , includes vessels used for transshipments.
211 Information partly provided by J. Verborgh (EC Commission). Except for Mauritania and Morocco this are all
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Iceland
Due to its involvement in NAFO and NEAFC and bilateral initiatives with Norway (see infra),
Iceland is in the process of developing a VMS which also applies within its own maritime
zones.212 Icelandic vessels that fall under the scope of these regional and bilateral
agreements are tracked both within and beyond the Icelandic EEZ. In addition, Icelandic
vessels fishing for shrimp in special areas in the Icelandic EEZ are to install ALCs. Foreign
vessels licensed to operate in the Icelandic EEZ are not subject to VMS, but this is likely to
happen within the next few years.213 The VMS makes use of Inmarsat-C, includes automatic
location reports and manual catch and activity reports and is expected to be finalized early in
2000.214
Japan
The VMS operated by Japan has been largely developed in the framework of negotiation of
access agreements and NAFO. Japanese tuna longliners that wish to undertake fishing in
the EEZ of South Africa and Japanese high seas trawlers in the EEZ of the Russian
Federation, are to obtain licenses from the Japanese government.215 One of the license
requirements is the installation of Argos equipment. While with regard to South Africa this
simply conforms to South African regulations (see infra), with regard to the Russian
Federation this is Japan’s own initiative. No satellite-based VMS applies to the maritime
zones of Japan.216
Malaysia
An important regulatory tool in Malaysia’s fisheries management is zoning. Accordingly, the
zone within 5 nm of the coast is reserved for artisanal fishing vessels, although these are
also allowed to fish further seaward. The zone between 5 and 12 nm is reserved for trawlers
or purse seiners below 40 grt, between 12 and 30 nm (Zone C) for vessels between 40 and
70 grt and beyond 30 nm (Zone C2) for vessels above 70 grt. The vessels operating in
Zones C and C2 have to comply with the fitting of ALCs which can work in conjunction with
Inmarsat-C.217 Transmitted data includes speed information and entry into and departure
from designated ports (5 nm radius). VMS implementation was originally scheduled for three
years, with fitting timed to coincide with the reissuing of fisheries licenses.  Certain vessels
are required to install ALCs ahead of schedule, viz. foreign owned or chartered (licensed)
                                                                                                                                                 
reciprocal agreements. See also R.R. Churchill, The European Community and its Role in Some Issues of
International Fisheries Law, in: ‘Developments in International Fisheries Law’, E. Hey (ed.), Kluwer Law
International, 1999, pp. 533-573, at pp. 565-568.
212 Authority is based on Art. 17 Fisheries Management Act (No. 38 of 15 May 1990) and Act No. 151 of 27
December 1996, which concerns Fisheries outside the Icelandic EEZ. Regs. No. 447/1999 and 6/2000
implement VMS obligations within the framework of NEAFC and NAFO respectively.
213 It concerns certain vessels flagged in the EC, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Norway and the Russian
Federation.
214 Based on Icelandic Vessel Monitoring System for Fisheries Control and Surveillance, prepared by the
Directorate of Fisheries and the Icelandic Coast Guard, and information kindly provided by Mr. G.
Kristmundsson, Directorate of Fisheries, January 2000.
215 Japanese tuna longliners also used to have access to the Australian EEZ where they had to install
Inmarsat-A (now C) equipment. Due to the impasse in the Commission for the Conservation of Southern
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), Japanese vessels have for the last two years been refused access to the Australian
EEZ.
216 Information kindly provided by Mr. S. Nakatsuka, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency of Japan,
May/June 1999.
217 Authority is based on S. 9 Fisheries Act 1985 (Act No. 317, http://agrolink.moa.my/dof). ALC requirements
are relatively stringent (see “Specifications of The Vessel Tracking Unit for the Vessel Tracking and
Management System”, at the website cited above).
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vessels or domestic vessels convicted for fisheries violations. Currently around 20 vessels
are tracked, including some domestic vessels. The total anticipated fleet size is 300-500
vessels.218
Maldives
Foreign vessels operating in the maritime zones of Maldives are since 1995 required to
carry ALCs (linked to Inmarsat-C), together with a system to monitor water temperatures.219
New Zealand220
Pursuant to the Fisheries (Satellite Vessel Monitoring) Regulations 1993,221 New Zealand
makes the installation of ALCs mandatory for the following vessels:
•  all foreign fishing vessels, including fish carriers;
•  all foreign chartered vessels registered as New Zealand fishing vessels;
•  all foreign unlicensed fishing vessels wishing to land their catch in New Zealand;
•  all New Zealand fishing vessels over 28 metres;
•  any New Zealand fishing vessel 28 metres or less which fish for orange roughy or
scampi;222
•  any New Zealand fishing vessel  operating outside the New Zealand EEZ.
Norway223
Apart from Norway’s participation in a number of RFMMs, it is also involved in satellite-
based VMSs through various initiatives at the bilateral level. In May 1999 Norway agreed on
a VMS Pilot Project with the EC, which would last from 1 July till 1 December 1999. A
certain number of vessels from both Parties would be tracked while operating in the
Norwegian EEZ and in the Community’s waters. The Pilot Project is likely to lead to a
bilateral compulsory satellite-based VMS as part of the bilateral agreement concerning
fisheries for 2000 between Norway and the EC.224 A Pilot Project similar to that of
Norway/EC was agreed on between Norway and Iceland in June 1999, and was scheduled
to take place between 1 August and 31 December 1999. Also in June 1999, a similar Pilot
Project was agreed on between Norway and the Russian Federation, and was scheduled to
start in the autumn of 1999 and end on 31 December 1999.225 Norwegian vessels not
covered under any of these bilateral agreements or RFMMs are currently not required to
install ALCs, but this is expected to be just a matter of time.226
                                               
218 Information partly based on comments kindly provided by Mr. J. Douglas, Absolute Communications Ltd.,
February 2000, and on Teo Siong Wan, The Monitoring, Control and Surveillance in Malaysia, FAO/Norway
Government Co-Operative Programme, GCP/INT/648/NOR, Regional Workshop on Fisheries Monitoring,
Control and Surveillance, Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Terengganu, Malaysia, 29 June – 3 July 1998, pp. 6, 8
and 9.
219 G.V. Everett, Some Observations on Fisheries Management Related to Monitoring, Control and
Surveillance Issues in the Region of the Southwest Indian Ocean and Maldives, in: ‘1996 Mauritius
Workshop’, supra note 11, at p. 51.
220 See also the references to New Zealand in notes 21, 61, 120, 154 and 155.
221 Ref. 1993/354. Information confirmed by A. Bedford, Ministry of Fisheries, New Zealand, January 2000.
222 See also the cooperation with Australia in relation to the 1998 STR Arrangement (supra, under Australia).
223 See also the references to Norway in note 133.
224 On 16 December 1999, Norway already enacted a Regulation relating to satellite-based monitoring of
foreign vessels. On 28 January 2000 Norway and the EC adopted an agreement concerning practicalities
on satellite tracking. Uniform implementation is expected to be effected by 1 July 2000.
225 Information kindly provided by Mr. T. Løbach (Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries), January 2000.
226 Perspectives on the Development of the Norwegian Fishing Industry, St. Meld No. 51 (1997-98), Norwegian
Ministry of Fisheries, pp. 59-60.
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Peru
The Peruvian VMS uses Argos and covers currently around 800 fishing vessels, but this
could be enlarged with another 200 small vessels. The types of ships covered are purse
seiners with more than 32.6 cubic metres storage capacity, trawlers and long liners.
Domestic and foreign vessels licensed to operate in Peru’s maritime zones are required to
install ALCs and have them switched on, but in certain cases tracking could also extend
beyond Peru’s maritime zones.227 A strong emphasis in the compliance effort is placed on
controlling that a zone of 5 nm adjacent to Peru’s coast is reserved for artisanal fisheries.
While the current focus is primarily on position verification, the transmitted information is
also to be used to ascertain the status of stocks, e.g. through the transmission of catch
reports and, in a second stage, by fitting a certain number of ships with sensors capable of
measuring sea salinity and temperature.228
South Africa229
South Africa requires all foreign vessels licensed to fish in its EEZ to install ALCs, which
they are to have switched on not only in the EEZ but within 400 nm from its coast.230 So far,
Japanese licensed vessels have not honored the requirement to have the ALC switched on
before entering the EEZ. ALCs will have to comply with certain minimum requirements,
which are currently met only by Inmarsat-C and Argos.
As regards national vessels, the matter is less straightforward. At the moment only
vessels fishing for patagonian toothfish in the EEZ around Marion Island are required to
install ALCs. This is a direct result of regulatory activity within CCAMLR (see infra). Like
Canada, South Africa pursues a phased-in approach, which could ultimately result in all
national fishing vessels having to install ALCs, in particular those involved in industrial
fisheries. In case of new or developing fisheries, for instance the pelagic longline fishery,
license negotiations with the Marine and Coastal Management Directorate will certainly
include the issue of ALCs. Also, following a request by the Marine and Coastal Management
Directorate, many of the 70 trawlers engaged in the demersal fishery in the South African
EEZ have agreed to install ALCs. In the near future, national vessels involved in high seas
fisheries will also be required to install ALCs as one of the license-conditions.231
United States232
                                               
227 Art. 4 of the most recent draft of the Regulations for a System of Satellite Tracking of National and Foreign
Fishing Vessels (Satellite Tracking Regulations), to be adopted by Supreme Decree in 2000. General
authority is based on Decree-Law No. 25977, containing the General Law on Fisheries, and Art. 6 Supreme
Decree No. 008-97-PE, which provides for the implementation of a System of Satellite Control of fishing
vessels. Supreme Decree No. 002-99-PE (will) list(s) in paras. (10) and (25)-(30) several types of behavior
relevant to the Peruvian VMS, as administrative infractions. Foreign vessels predominantly fish for giant
squid (with jigging machines). Although foreign purse seiners cannot in general operate in Peru’s maritime
zones, an exception is made for those fishing for tuna.
228 See also Title III which, inter alia, envisages use of VMS data by the Marine Institute of Peru and the
Ministry of Defense. Information kindly supplied by Mr. L. Icochea, Facultad de Pesqueria, Universidad
Nacional Agraria - La Molina, Peru, June 1999 and Ms. V. Rojas Montes, Ministry of Fisheries, January
2000.
229 See also the references to South Africa in notes 120, 141 and 154.
230 While the requirements on ALCs are included in licenses, the authority to issue fishing licenses subject to
conditions is laid down in the 1998 Marine Living Resources Act (No. 18 of 27 May 1998, Government
Gazette, No. 18930; text also available at: http://www.gov.za/acts). Ss. 18/23(1), 39(2) and 41(1) require
licenses for local fishing by national vessels, foreign vessels and high seas fishing for national vessels
respectively.
231 Information kindly provided by R. Leslie, Sea Fisheries Research Institute, Department of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism, South Africa, June 1999.
232 See also the references to the United States in notes 59, 127, 140, 156, 169 and 170.
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The United States began experimenting with a satellite-based VMS in the Hawaii region in
1995.233 Only vessels holding a Hawaii longline limited access permit are subject to the
obligation to install a VMS unit (ALC). The regulatory approach of the Hawaii system is
linked to closed areas. The other major fishery in which the United States operates a VMS is
the Atlantic sea scallop fishery.234 The United States uses various service providers
(Inmarsat, Boatracs and Argos) to track around 550 vessels with a future potential of
another 1600 vessels. Although foreign vessels could in theory apply for an access permit,
these have never been granted, mainly due to the absence of a surplus in TAC. Recently it
has been decided to start a national scheme in which information will first be transmitted to
Washington D.C. and then distributed to the relevant regions. The national scheme is
currently in the drafting stage.235
The fact that prohibition of fishing in closed areas is not subject to criminal proceedings
but to civil/administrative proceedings, has important implications for the standard of proof.
Rather than the ‘reasonable doubt’ which would be required under criminal law, it will be
sufficient to establish a certain ‘preponderance of the evidence’.  The primary evidence used
for prosecution are the photograph and pilot observations, or the boarding crew report. The
signature printout (navigation pattern of the vessel) might in the future be used as further
evidence of fishing, or conclusive evidence of location. In the Hawaii region about three
cases are prosecuted each year, but as a settlement is reached each time, they are not
taken to Court.236
6.3 Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms (RFMMs)
CCAMLR (Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources)
The XVIIth meeting of CCAMLR adopted Conservation Measure 148/XVII, entitled
‘Automated Satellite-Linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS)’, which requires Contracting
States237 to install ALCs on board of its fishing vessels “which are licensed in accordance
with Conservation Measure 119/XVII, to harvest marine living resources in the Convention
Area, and for which catch limits, fishing seasons or area restrictions have been set by
Conservation Measures adopted by the Commission”.238 The system, which does not apply
to vessels engaged only in krill fisheries, should be operative from 1 March 1999 onwards,
but in any case not later than 31 December 2000. At the XVIIIth  Meeting of CCAMLR,
October/November 1999, several States suggested that there was no rationale for
exempting krill vessels from the VMS requirement, but consensus to change Conservation
Measure 148/XVII accordingly could not be reached.239
                                               
233 The Hawaii system is governed by Ss. 660.22 (r-y) and 660.25 Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 50,
based on the Magnuson Act.
234 See 50 Code of Federal Regulations 648.9. Carriage of ALCs in the Northwest Hawaiian Islands crustacean
fisheries is voluntary (Hitchen and Yin 1999, supra note 16, at Section 5.1). The number of vessels tracked
in the Northeast Groundfish fishery and the Alaska Atka Mackerel fishery is quite small. The number of
Taiwanese vessels referred to in note 140 is 24.
235 See Hitchen and Yin 1999, supra note 16. In Section 5.3 and 5.4 they note that VMS is being implemented
in the high migratory stocks fisheries in the Southeast (September 1999) and Northeast (particularly
northern bluefin tuna).
236 Information kindly obtained from Mr. P. Ortiz (NOAA), 1999.
237 The following States have ratified the CCAMLR Convention (supra note 26) and are Members of CCAMLR
are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, EC, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea (ROC),
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. Currently there are also 6 Acceding States, i.e. States that have
ratified the Convention, but are not Members of CCAMLR. These are: Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Greece,
the Netherlands and Peru (http://www.ccamlr.org.).
238 Para. (1). The text of Conservation Measures is available at http://www.ccamlr.org.
239 See CCAMLR-XVIII/25, paras. 3.13-3.24 (Report of the Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection
(SCOI); also attached as Annex 5 to CCAMLR-XVIII). The current state of implementation of Cons. Meas.
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FFA (South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency)
One of the key objectives of the FFA is to promote intra-regional coordination and
cooperation in fisheries surveillance and enforcement.240 In November 1997, the Forum
Fisheries Committee (FFC)241 approved requirements governing the FFA VMS which have
now been incorporated into the Harmonized Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign
Fishing Vessel Access (MTCs).  The key aspects of the FFA VMS include:
•  any foreign fishing vessel that wishes to apply for a license to fish in the maritime
zones242 of a FFA Member State must first be registered on the VMS Register of Foreign
Fishing Vessels maintained by the FFA. This VMS registration procedure complements
procedural requirements which have to be met in order to obtain licenses from FFA
Member States;243
•  foreign fishing vessels shall not be permitted to fish in the maritime zones of FFA
Member States unless the vessels are licensed in accordance with the Common
Regional Fisheries Licence Form;
•  all foreign fishing vessels licensed to fish in the maritime zones of Member States are to
install ALCs approved by the FFA and operated in accordance with the FFA VMS
Guidelines.244
While the FFA has no formal powers to ensure the implementation of the FFA VMS in FFA
Member States, pursuant to the FFC’s adoption of the FFA VMS, the Member States are
held to implement the VMS requirements in national legislation. The FFC “retains the
primary responsibility for providing general policy and administrative guidance for the
operation of the VMS Register”.245 Moreover, although none of the requirements just listed
mentions that domestic vessels are to be subjected to the same conditions, several FFA
Member States are already requiring this.246
Currently, all FFA Member States have enacted legislation to implement the FFA VMS,
or are in process of doing so. These enactments, which are largely similar in content,247
cover common issues such as ALC-related conditions and penalties for non-compliance.
More specifically, provision is also made for the coastal State’s claim of ownership to all
VMS data generated in its maritime zones and the confidentiality of VMS data, including
circumstances in which such information can be released. The rate of implementation of the
VMS by FFA Member States differs; largely according to the type and nature of foreign
fishing activities in each Member State’s maritime zones. Some Member States (e.g.
                                                                                                                                                 
148/XVII is set out in CCAMLR-XVIII, para. 2.15.
240 Art. V(2)(c) South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) Convention (10 July 1978. In force 9 August
1979). Currently there are 16 Member States to the FFA Convention: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa (http://www.ffa.int.). Among the successful
fisheries enforcement initiatives developed by the FFA are the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing
Vessels, the MTCs (see infra in main text) and the negotiation of the Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries
Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region (Niue, May 1992. In force 10 May 1993).
241 The FFC is the governing body for the FFA (see Art. V FFA Convention).
242 While certain FFA Member States limit access by foreign vessels to the EEZ, others also include the
territorial sea and/or archipelagic waters.
243 Information obtained from the FFA Homepage at http://www.ffa.int and the FFA VMS Guidelines (see infra
in main text).
244 Vessel Monitoring System Guidelines for Installation and Registration of Automatic Location
Communicators. The FFA VMS Guidelines are specified in the MTCs.
245 Art. 1.1 of the Procedure for the Operation of the VMS Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels (Annex 4 to the
MTCs, as amended by FFC34 (24-28 November 1997)).
246 Australia, New Zealand, the Solomon Islands and (probably) Papua New Guinea.
247 With the exception of New Zealand and Australia which have their own VMS regulatory framework in
addition to their commitment to the FFA VMS.
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Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea) have fully implemented the VMS requirements
and have declined to license foreign fishing vessels that do not comply with the ALC
conditions. At the time of writing, 87 foreign fishing vessels have been registered on the
VMS Register. This number is expected to climb to about one thousand when the VMS is
fully operational.248
ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas)
On 21 December 1995, at its Fourteenth Regular Meeting, ICCAT adopted a Resolution on
Vessel Monitoring which encourages flag States to use satellite tracking. At the 1997
Meeting, ICCAT adopted a ‘Vessel Monitoring System Pilot Program’ which came into effect
on 13 July 1998. Essentially it recommends Contracting Parties249 to adopt a pilot program
on a satellite-based VMS for ten percent of certain types of vessels flying their flags and
fishing for ICCAT species on the high seas outside the fisheries jurisdiction of any coastal
State. The three-year pilot program will be effective on 1 January 1999, except for vessels
fishing in the Mediterranean which will be effective on 1 January 2000. ICCAT shall evaluate
the pilot program at its 2002 meeting.
NAFO (Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization)
In the follow-up to the Estai incident and the adoption of the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,
NAFO adopted a ‘Pilot Project for Observers and Satellite Tracking’. At the 20th Annual
meeting of NAFO in September 1998, the Fisheries Commission adopted a new Part VI to
the NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures, entitled ‘Program for Observers and
Satellite Tracking’.250 Under this program, NAFO Contracting Parties251 are to require all
vessels flying their flags that fish, or plan to fish, in the NAFO Regulatory Area to be
equipped with satellite tracking devices as soon as possible and not later than 1 January
2001.252
NEAFC (North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission)
The NEAFC adopted a Recommendation on a Scheme of Control and Enforcement in
respect of Fishing Vessels Fishing in Areas beyond the Limits of National Fisheries
Jurisdiction in the Convention Area (NEAFC Scheme). Article 9 on Vessel Monitoring
System provides that each NEAFC Contracting Party253 shall implement no later than 1
January 2000, a VMS by inter alia ensuring that FMCs shall be operational and that satellite
                                               
248 Information provided by FFA Secretariat.
249 Currently there are 26 Contracting Parties to the ICCAT Convention (International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Rio de Janeiro, 14 May 1966. In force 21 March 1969, United Nations
Legislative Series UN/LEG/SER.B/16, pp. 483-491): Angola, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China (PRC),
Equatorial Guinea, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Korea (ROC), Libya,
Morocco, Panama, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, South Africa, Spain, the
United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela (http://www.iccat.es).
250 Supplement to the basic NAFO/FC Doc. 98/1 (serial No. N2976).
251 Currently there are 17 Contracting Parties to the NAFO Convention (Convention on Future Multilateral
Cooperation in the Nortwest Atlantic Fisheries, Ottawa, 24 October 1978. In force 1 January 1979) Bulgaria,
Canada, Cuba, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands & Greenland), Estonia, EC, France (in respect of
St. Pierre et Miquelon), Iceland, Japan, Korea (ROC), Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, the
Russian Federation and the United States (http://www.nafo.ca).
252 Introduction to Part VI. Information kindly obtained from Mr. H. Koster, Chef d’Unité Inspection, European
Commission.
253 Currently there are 6 Contracting Parties to the NEAFC Convention (Convention on Future Multilateral
Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries, 18 November 1980. In force 17 March 1982,
http://www.neafc.org): Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands & Greenland), EC, Iceland, Norway, Poland
and the Russian Federation.
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tracking devises are installed on board of fishing vessels.254 Attachment V to the NEAFC
Scheme contains specific measures on the secure and confidential treatment of VMS
information, which could set an example for other RFMMs.
Central Bering Sea
The 1994 Central Bering Sea Convention255 requires in Article XI(3)(a) that Contracting
Parties256 shall require their fishing vessels that fish for pollock in the Convention Area to
use real-time satellite position-fixing transmitters while in the Bering Sea.257 Currently, the
six Contracting Parties have agreed to a moratorium on pollock fishing in the Central Bering
Sea. Nevertheless, each Contracting Party is allowed to authorize two vessels to conduct
‘test’ fishing in the Central Bering Sea. These vessels are required to carry ALCs. As soon
as the moratorium is lifted, all fishing vessels that operate in the Bering Sea have to meet
this requirement.258
6.4 Conclusions
The State practice examined above reveals a considerable number of States which already
operate a satellite-based VMS either as part of their obligations within the framework of
RFMMs or independent therefrom. The most prominent distinction in these regulatory
initiatives is naturally that between flag, port and coastal State approaches.259 Which
approach, or combination of approaches, is pursued by a State depends on a wide range of
circumstances, including not only a State’s participation in RFMMs but more generally the
type of considerations discussed in Section 3.2. Another noticeable difference in regulatory
approach is that between a regime where the need for a satellite-based VMS is assessed
for each fishery individually, and a regime where VMS is imposed more generally on all
fishing vessels or those above a certain size.260
A further observation is the lack of uniformity and compatibility which is largely caused
by a State’s freedom of choice in system providers and ALCs. In light of the non-
compatibility of VMS technology this is admittedly difficult to avoid. The more flexible
attitudes of RFMMs towards the choice of system providers can be explained by the fact
that the RFMMs play only a facilitating role, whereas the actual operation of the VMS is
carried out by its participants. While RFMMs are not likely to be charged with a true
enforcement role, it is not imaginative that their roles might be enlarged with a clearing-
house function,261 which will increase pressure on participants to maintain high levels of
compliance.
                                               
254 See also Annex VI.
255 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea,
Washington, 16 June 1994. In force 8 December 1995, 34 International Legal Materials 67 (1995).
256 These are: China (PRC), Japan, Poland, South Korea (ROK), the Russian Federation and the United
States.
257 See also Art. XI(4)(a) which stipulates that Parties shall exchange VMS data “on a real-time basis through
bilateral channels”.
258 The Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Group established minimum standards and specifications for VMS
equipment in 1995, but these do not indicate a preference for a specific system. Information kindly provided
by Ms. S. Auer (NOAA), January 2000.
259 See note 185 for a comment on port State approaches.
260 Most of the States examined in Section 6.2, except the EC, fall in the first category, whereas the second
category would appear more pertinent to the EC and the group of RFMMs. Of course, this could be merely
the VMS’ evolutionary stage or the fact that a RFMM manages fisheries which lend themselves more easily
to a more general VMS approach.
261 Which is presently already performed by the FFA (which is not a ‘real’ RFMM; supra note 183). Some flag
States appear to be unhappy with such a clearing-house function. For example, Japan has consistently
opposed a centralized VMS by FFA Member States. Recently, Japan has indicated that it is developing its
own VMS and is encouraging FFA Member States to use it (information provided by FFA Secretariat,
February 2000). This initiative certainly has to be seen in the context of the ongoing VMS debate in the
CWPFO-process (supra note 184).
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7 Conclusions
Satellite-based vessel monitoring systems (VMSs) are but one example of applied modern
technology which have the potential for profoundly changing fisheries management in the
immediate future. The availability of near real-time information on fishing activities within
enormous ocean surfaces opens up almost unimagined management options, particularly
for those concerned with data gathering and ensuring compliance. The recognition of this
potential is reflected in the rapidly expanding use by States, regional fisheries management
mechanisms (RFMMs) and ship operators alike. Ongoing developments indicate that the
obligatory use of automatic location communicators (ALCs) as part of a VMS is likely to be
applied in all major industrial fisheries within the next few years.262
This article purports to identify some of the main policy and legal considerations which
States and RFMMs should take into account when developing satellite-based VMSs for
fisheries management.263 From a policy perspective it is firstly essential that the principal
limitations are fully understood: (a) vessels not equipped with ALCs, or whose ALCs are not
functioning properly, cannot be located. Complementary means of surveillance will therefore
always be necessary. Satellite remote sensing (SRS) is one option although it is not yet
operational at either the national or the regional level; (b) traditional means of surveillance
by sea or air will generally be required to bring or order offenders to port and thus ensure
prosecution; and (c) a satellite-based VMS is most effective in conjunction with management
based on measures such as closed areas, exclusion zones, closed seasons or restricted
fishing days. Secondly, it is critical that thorough assessment ascertains that a satellite-
based VMS is in fact the most cost-effective compared to other means of data gathering
and monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS). Thirdly, crucial to the success of the system
is the way in which it guarantees the confidentiality and security of the information
transmitted to the management authority. Insufficient emphasis on this aspect is bound to
have severe repercussions for cooperation and compliance.
A more general policy aspect is the observation that satellite-based VMSs will in many
situations be the most cost-effective if applied on a regional basis. Although State practice
reflects a growing number of States that use satellite-tracking either independently or
through a RFMM, global coverage has by no means been achieved yet. In this situation, the
existence of non-compatible VMS technology and a wide range of policy options, calls for
global strategies and harmonization.
In addition to policy considerations, a fisheries management authority will have to accept
that the scope of application of its satellite-based VMS will have to comply with applicable
rules of international law. The ensuing restrictions are particularly apparent if it takes a
coastal or port State approach, as defined in Section 4.1. Rather than exercising jurisdiction
over ships that bear their own nationality, which Section 4.1 categorizes under flag States,
jurisdiction exercised by coastal and port States relates to foreign vessels that engage in
certain activities in the coastal State’s maritime zones or even beyond. The main
conclusions which can be derived from the complex analysis are:
•  foreign vessels that wish to engage in fishing, fish processing or fish transshipments
in a coastal State’s maritime zones can be required to install ALCs;
•  foreign fishing vessels with fishing licenses cannot be required to have the ALC
switched on for a considerable time in advance of entering the coastal State’s
maritime zones, or after departure therefrom. The flag State may of course require
                                               
262 FAO Doc. COFI/97/INF.6 (supra note 42), p. 2.
263 Account should also be taken of the various technical difficulties in ensuring that a VMS functions
satisfactorily.
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its vessels to have the ALC switched on continuously and thereby alleviate the
coastal State’s concerns. Likewise, RFMMs may impose such a requirement on
ships operating in the high seas adjacent to a coastal State’s maritime zones;
•  foreign vessels without fishing licenses cannot be asked to install ALCs or to have
them switched on if they merely exercise rights of navigation in a coastal State’s
maritime zones. Arguably, it would not necessarily amount to an abuse of rights to
require such vessels to install ALCs as a condition for entry into port. However, as
port States would not have a basis of jurisdiction to require such ships to have the
ALC switched on prior to entry into port, this previous requirement appears useless;
•  the situation with regard to foreign fishing support vessels that engage in bunkering
of fishing vessels in EEZs might be the most controversial. The resolution of this
conflict in use will depend on classifying bunkering as freedom of navigation or an
use associated therewith under Article 58(1) LOSC and the extent of coastal State
jurisdiction under Article 62(4) LOSC. In the end, the matter may have to be treated
as a residual right under Article 59 LOSC and necessitate resolution by a body like
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), even though the ITLOS did
not resolve the issue in the Saiga (Merits) Case.
All four of these conclusions relate to the way in which the law of the sea, as laid down in
the LOSC and occasionally elaborated by the recently adopted global instruments relevant
to fisheries management, defines the distribution of jurisdiction between flag States on the
one hand and coastal and port States on the other. States and RFMMs are held to respect
this jurisdictional balance and to abstain from unilateral exercises of extra-territorial
jurisdiction if this would be inconsistent with the pacta tertiis principle. Nevertheless, various
indications exist that States and RFMMs are probing the limits of international law, in
particular with regard to port State jurisdiction. The fact that the use of satellite-based VMSs
and ALCs is likely to have spread widely in the near future will certainly be in their
advantage.
